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SUMMARY
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between climate and economic activity.
In particular, I analyze methods for the measurement of climate change impacts on macroe-
conomic outcomes and the role of solar geoengineering in reducing these impacts. Solar
geoengineering is different from traditional mitigation in at least three ways; it is inexpen-
sive, quick, and imperfect. These characteristics place the technology as an imperfect but
arguably inevitable insurance policy against the extreme effects of climate change. As such,
it is important to understand effect of the solar geoengineering option on aggregate and dis-
tributional economic outcomes. To examine the economic impacts of solar geoengineering,
this study applies an empirically estimated causal relationship between country-level eco-
nomic growth and climate to illustrative future climate scenarios with and without solar
geoengineering. Solar geoengineering is found to have an uncertain, model dependent im-
pact on global economic outcomes but is consistently found to reduce inter-country income
inequality by averting the worst economic impacts of climate change in poorer countries.
The final study of this dissertation examines the methodology for estimating macroeco-
nomic impacts of climate change to analyze contrasting results between microeconomic
and macroeconomic empirical studies of the US. This study develops a general equilib-
rium theoretical framework with weather shocks that demonstrates how local, micro-level
weather shocks impact macroeconomic growth. Using the theoretical findings, I construct
macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks across the spatial distribution and industrial
composition of economic activity in the US. Weather shocks are found to have a signif-
icant impact at the microeconomic level, but as impacts are aggregated, the significance
becomes masked by the aggregation. This suggests that macroeconomic impact estimates




Driven by persistent growth in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stemming from
economic activity since the industrial revolution, climate change poses an ever-growing
risk to many facets of our society. Pertinent to determining the appropriate actions to
lessen these risks is an accurate understanding of the relationship between the climate and
socioeconomic outcomes and the impact of available policy options. Three distinct options
to reduce the impacts and risks associated with climate change have been identified: mit-
igation of greenhouse gas emissions, adaption, and geoengineering. Each has distinctive
characteristics. While an optimal policy prescription is likely to use some of each option in
combination, the appropriate mixture remains an open question.
In this dissertation, I write three chapters that apply tools within the economic frame-
work that contribute to this question. These essays extend the boundaries of our compre-
hension of both the relationship between climate and human society as well as the impact
of solar geoengineering as a policy option. I take particular aim at improving our under-
standing of the distribution and heterogeneity of climate and solar geoengineering impacts
across both space and industrial composition of economic activity. This an area critical for
informing discussions around climate justice, ethics, and international politics.
I focus on solar geoengineering because it has only been recognized as a credible cli-
mate policy option in recent decades. Consequentially, it is the least understood of the three
climate policy options. In Chapter 2, “Solar geoengineering economics: from incredible
to inevitable and half-way back,” written in collaboration with Dr. Juan Moreno-Cruz, I
document the evolution of economic thinking around the solar geoengineering option. In
this essay, I highlight the importance of its distinguishing characteristics – that it is cheap,
fast, but imperfect – on its evaluated role and impact on existing climate policy.
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I document that economists were initially intrigued by the incredible economics of solar
geoengineering due to its low cost and rapid effect. In comparison to mitigation, engineer-
ing cost estimates by researchers found that solar geoengineering could potentially alleviate
some of the greatest risks of climate change in a fraction of the time and at a fraction of the
cost. However, this intrigue quickly transformed into concerns of the inevitability of solar
geoengineering.
Economists began to construct models of incentives and strategic decision-making around
the solar geoengineering option. Using both theory and empirics, economists recognized
that the same low-cast characteristic that made the solar geoengineering incredible could
also make it inevitable. This gave rise to concerns of the potential for a “free-driver”
problem in which an individual actor or small group of actors unilaterally implement solar
geoengineering to their benefit and the potential detriment of others. Further, the presence
of the solar geoengineering option can create a moral hazard problem in which countries
reduce their mitigation efforts because of an expectation of solar geoengineering imple-
mentation in the future.
Consequently, economists have taken a step half-way back as they delve deeper into the
potential risks and international political concerns of solar geoengineering implementation.
Here, I conclude by outlining important avenues for future work where economists can
contribute to the discourse around solar geoengineering in the road ahead. Equipped with a
framework centered on incentives, economists are well-poised to analyze how to effectively
construct a governance structure that permits a coordinated and ethical implementation,
or ban, of solar geoengineering. Essential to this are the uncertainties and risks of solar
geoengineering implementation as well as its distributional impacts. While economists
have recognized these factors, a more careful and detailed analysis needs to be put forward.
In Chapter 3, “Climate econometric models indicate solar geoengineering would re-
duce inter-country income inequality,” written in collaboration with Dr. Katharine Ricke,
Dr. Juan Moreno-Cruz, Dr. Douglas MacMartin, and Dr. Daniel Heyen, I address the distri-
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butional impacts of solar geoengineering by empirically estimating its impact on country-
level economic growth. To facilitate comparison with existing analyses of climate change
impacts, I apply existing climate econometric methods. In particular, I apply established
econometric methods to estimate a historical relationship between country-level climate
and economic growth. I then apply this historical relationship to evaluate projections of so-
cioeconomic outcomes across a range of stylized climate scenarios both with and without
solar geoengineering.
Evaluating country-level economic growth over the 21st century across stylized climate
scenarios and econometric models, I consistently find that scenarios with solar geoengi-
neering have lower inter-country income inequality. Implementing solar geoengineering to
offset the warming of mean global temperatures from climate change reverts the impacts
of climate change, but not exactly due to the imperfections of solar geoengineering. Since
the poorest countries are consistently found to be the most negatively impacted by climate
change, they conversely have the most to gain from solar geoengineering. Implementing
solar geoengineering to over-cool mean global temperatures is found to further decrease
inter-country income inequality by further benefiting the poorest countries. This acceler-
ates convergence in country-level incomes. Solar geoengineering is also found to improve
aggregate global economic outcomes, but this result is dependent on the econometric spec-
ification.
Following the findings of Chapter 2, the findings of Chapter 3 provide important and
informative insights for the discourse around geoengineering ethics and governance. The
finding that solar geoengineering reduces inter-country income inequality by benefiting the
economic growth of poorer, developing economies stands in contrast to prevailing concerns
that solar geoengineering favors developed countries. Important caveats from this research
also highlight important areas for future work. These findings come from the evaluation
of stylized climate scenarios, which may be inconsistent with future solar geoengineering.
This suggests the need for further evaluation in a strategic decision-making framework as
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well as further work on the global governance of solar geoengineering. Additionally, these
findings rely on the assumption that historically trained climate econometric models are
valid for future projections and the application of solar geoengineering. This is a possible
concern that warrants greater consideration for both climate change and solar geoengineer-
ing projection analyses.
Taking a step back, in Chapter 4, “From Micro-level Weather Shocks to Macroeco-
nomic Impacts,” I examine empirical estimation of the impacts of climate on economic
outcomes, such as the climate econometric method implemented in Chapter 3. Specifi-
cally, I provide an explanation for a seeming paradox between empirical studies analyzing
the relationship between the climate and economic outcomes at the microeconomic and
macroeconomic scales. Recent macroeconomic empirical analyses have found the eco-
nomic growth of developed economies, like the US, to be insensitive to changes in weather
or climate. However, at a more resolute scale, microeconomic empirical studies have found
a variety of economic factors, such as labor productivity, agricultural productivity, and mor-
tality to be sensitive in these same countries.
I first develop a theoretical framework founded on microeconomic principles to de-
scribe the relationship between local weather shocks and macroeconomic outcomes. Using
the model, I examine the equilibrium impact of a supply-side shock to the labor productiv-
ity of a representative producer for an industry-region from an idiosyncratic weather shock
in that region on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the economy. I find that the ag-
gregate economic impact can be captured by the impact of the weather shock on the labor
productivity times the economic size of the producer, measured by their value-added share
as a fraction of GDP. This provides a theoretical foundation for constructing the macroeco-
nomic impacts of weather shocks.
Applying the theoretical findings, I construct empirical estimates of the macroeconomic
impacts of weather shocks across the continental United States (US). I focus on the US be-
cause it is exemplary of the contradictory microeconomic and macroeconomic empirical
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findings I seek to explain. Constructing macroeconomic impact estimates requires infor-
mation on the sensitivity of labor productivity to weather shocks across region-industry
producers and the economic size of these producers. The second I get directly from data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), but the first is not observed and must be
empirically estimated. I empirically estimate this relationship using panel data fixed effects
methods to capture a heterogeneous and non-linear relationship between labor productivity
growth and changes in temperature and precipitation across industries. I construct empir-
ical estimates of the annual impact of weather shocks across the US on GDP. Consistent
with previous empirical analyses, I find no statistically significant evidence of an aggregate
economic impact of weather shocks in the US.
Without a theoretical foundation, interpretation of empirical findings can lead to mis-
leading conclusions and misguided inference. No statistically significant evidence of an
aggregate economic impact of weather shocks in the US could lead to the inference that
climate change will have little to no effect on the US economy. However, the theoretical
framework on which these estimates are based permits an analysis of weather shock im-
pacts on GDP at different resolutions. I examine how weather shocks across the country
contribute to economic growth at the county, industry, and county-industry levels. I find
that, at higher levels of resolution, weather shocks have statistically significant impacts on
GDP in the US. However, these impacts are heterogeneous both across the spatial distribu-
tion and industrial composition of the US in any given year. This provides evidence that
the aggregation of weather shock impacts can mask considerable underlying heterogeneity
and that inference from macroeconomic estimates can be misleading.
The historical insensitivity of macroeconomic US outcomes to weather shocks appears
to be a mechanical consequence of how economic impacts aggregate within an economy.
However, exploring whether economics can explain this outcome is an interesting possi-
bility. For example, this could be the result of location sorting by producers or the exit of
firms following productivity shocks from the weather. The theoretical model analyzed in
5
this chapter does not allow for this type of exploration, but it could be extended. This is left
for future research. Another interesting question left to future consideration is whether this




SOLAR GEOENGINEERING ECONOMICS: FROM INCREDIBLE TO
INEVITABLE AND HALF-WAY BACK.
The following chapter is a reprint of a published paper:
Harding, A. and J.B. Moreno-Cruz (2016), Solar geoengineering economics: from incredi-
ble to inevitable and half-way back. Earth’s Future, 4, 569–577, doi:10.1002/2016EF000462
Solar geoengineering technologies are unique in many ways, and the economic incen-
tives they could unleash are just as interesting. Since their introduction as a potential al-
ternative, economists have been intrigued by the potential of these technologies to dramat-
ically alter the way we think about climate policy. As our scientific understanding of the
technologies evolve, so does the way economists think about them. In this paper, we doc-
ument the evolution of economic thinking around these technologies since before Crutzen
(2006) until today and provide some fruitful areas for further research.
2.1 Introduction
The economics and politics of climate change have so far focused, among other things,
on creating incentives for individuals and nations to incorporate the environmental costs
associated with climate change into their actions and policies. A persisting problem in this
field is that of free-riding on mitigation. Free-riding occurs because the climate is shared
by everyone, in that any one country cannot exclude others from its use, so there is little
incentive for countries to cooperate with others by paying the high costs of mitigation as
they expect others to pay for it. Because climate change impacts are heterogeneous across
nations and economies, this lack of action also creates differential impacts with poorer,
equatorial countries carrying the heaviest burden of these climate impacts [1].
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In 2006, Paul Crutzen wrote an article that reintroduced the possibility of solar geo-
engineering as a technology that could reduce the costs of dealing with climate change [2].
Barrett [3] then asserted that this “incredible” economics of solar geoengineering would
fundamentally alter climate change economics. However, solar geoengineering is more
than cheap. As identified by Moreno-Cruz and Keith [4] and Keith et al. [5], solar geo-
engineering is different from traditional mitigation in at least three ways; it is inexpensive,
quick, and imperfect. Since it has low costs of deployment relative to mitigation, it has
the potential to reduce the free-riding problem to a simpler one of cost-sharing, but it can
also introduce new problems. Though there may be political consequences, due to its low
deployment costs relative to mitigation costs, individual countries or small coalitions of
countries could unilaterally implement solar geoengineering without regard to the dam-
ages to others, a problem Weitzman [6] calls a “free-driver” problem. Moreover, it can be
implemented and have an effect quickly, almost completely eliminating the inertia of the
carbon-climate system. This could allow society to better respond to the uncertainties and
threats of climate change. However, solar geoengineering is imperfect in three ways. First,
it cannot compensate for changes in the climate that are not directly tied to temperature,
for example, ocean acidification. Second, it can create side effects that are unique to the
technology, heterogeneous across regions, and worse in a world with high carbon concen-
trations in the atmosphere. Third, sudden suspension of solar geoengineering can cause
climate change to resume at a faster pace than before solar geoengineering deployment.
These characteristics imply that, while there is a role for solar geoengineering to play in
the climate policy agenda, this role is limited and needs to be understood in the context of
other alternative ways to manage climate change.
Building on reviews of the economic literature on solar geoengineering by Klepper and
Rickels [7, 8] and Heutel et al. [9], this paper introduces the different ways the literature
in economics has introduced solar geoengineering into the economics of climate change
to noneconomists in the hope of spurring more interdisciplinary work in this field. As
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exhibited in the rest of the paper, much of work done by economists has been to add an
economic framework to the work of researchers in other fields, providing further insights
into the climate change discussion. We hope this paper will inform researchers about the
areas of the literature that economists have begun to establish a foothold and the importance
of their contribution as well as show the areas of research that need the most contribution
by economists and non-economists alike moving forward.
Specifically, in the rest of the paper, we show different ways the literature in economics
have introduced solar geoengineering into the economics of climate change in three sepa-
rate, but related, sections. We first introduce the simplest economic tool to deal with the
design and evaluation of climate policy, engineering cost analyses, and show how this tool
has been applied to the study of solar geoengineering. Second, we introduce tools used
to analyze optimal climate policy and show how allowing for uncertainty and risk in the
analysis of climate policy changes the policy prescriptions derived under engineering cost
analyses. Third, we discuss the literature on international politics of climate policy and
the need for governance of geoengineering. For this, we first present economic analyses of
strategic decision making using a game theoretical approach and then we present proposed
governance structures. In the final section of the paper, we highlight the areas of research
that are promising and where more work needs to be done both in economics and together
with the support of interdisciplinary research.
2.2 Engineering Cost Analyses
As solar geoengineering becomes a realistic option to combat the effects of climate change,
many researchers and governments have begun to evaluate its feasibility and role in the
climate change conversation. The simplest and most frequently used tool to initiate dis-
cussions about feasibility is the engineering cost analysis. The goal of an engineering cost
analysis is to quantify the accounting or engineering costs of implementing a policy like so-
lar geoengineering. As exhibited in this section, ongoing scientific and economic advances
9
in solar geoengineering research have continually advanced the estimates of engineering
cost analyses, but there is always room for improvement in their accuracy.
One of the earliest engineering cost analyses of solar geoengineering, which was cited
by Crutzen [2], was conducted by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Panel on Policy
Implications of Greenhouse Warming in 1992 as part of a larger study of climate change.
The panel quantifies the costs of the capital and engineering requirements for implemen-
tation using market prices for comparable capital and materials at the time. For an effect
equivalent to mitigating the amount of the 1989 U.S. emissions, the panel provides what
they consider a conservative estimate for the cost of implementation by naval rifles in the
range $0.25-$0.5 billion and even less by aircraft [10]. This leads the panel to conclude by
expressing their surprise at the nominal cost of geoengineering options. This extremely low
cost, especially compared to previously estimated costs for mitigation, opened the door for
solar geoengineering as an alternative to mitigation, warranting further research and more
in-depth analysis.
Inspired by the National Academy of Sciences’ foundational analysis, other researchers
have examined different implementation methods in more detail and with greater accuracy
as solar geoengineering research has progressed. Robock et al. [11] quantify the costs of
commonly discussed solar geoengineering techniques such as the use of airplanes, artillery
shells, and balloons. By repurposing existing capital to reduce costs even further, they
estimate the costs of injecting 1 TgS of a sulfur gas per year into the stratosphere varies
between $0.225-30 billion depending on the implementation method. Royal Society [12]
produce a report similar to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, examining different
geoengineering techniques. In the section on solar geoengineering, the authors, in agree-
ment with existing research, note the high affordability of this technique with estimates in
the order of $10 billion to deliver between 1 and 5 million tons of stratospheric aerosols
per year [12]. McClellan et al. [13], the most detailed study to date, examine the costs
of delivering 1-5 million metric tons of albedo modification material into the stratosphere
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using different airship based delivery systems. The authors conclude that the costs would
be in the range of $1-8 billion depending on the delivery system and the quantity delivered
[13].
The consistency of results in engineering cost analyses provides evidence that, in terms
of engineering deployment costs, solar geoengineering could be significantly cheaper than
previously estimated costs of global emission control [14]. With these results, Barrett [3]
argues that the costs of implementation are far outweighed by the potential benefits of
reducing damages from climate change. Barrett [3], Schelling [15], and Blackstock and
Long [16] additionally argue that the estimated costs are so low compared to the benefits,
just a fraction of some countries’ gross national product, that nations may be able to act
alone, unilaterally implementing solar geoengineering. This has redirected the climate
change conversation from the issue of free-riding on mitigation to one of free-driving on
solar geoengineering, in which implementation seems inevitable. We explore this more in
section 2.4.
2.3 Optimal Climate Policy
Engineering cost analyses serve an important purpose in providing an initial, simple evalu-
ation of solar geoengineering and its financial plausibility through the use of a cost benefit
analysis. However, they do not capture the whole picture from an economists’ viewpoint.
As discussed by MacKerron [17], the true economic cost of solar geoengineering must
incorporate any externalities or social costs in addition to just engineering costs. This
includes costs as abstract as the changes in agricultural productivity due to impacts on pre-
cipitation to the change in peoples’ utility due to the predicted effect of the sky turning from
blue to white [18]. Additionally, the use of engineering cost analyses lack information in
terms of the “best way” to use these technologies because they can only determine whether
a single policy path is beneficial. “Best way” here has a very precise meaning of “optimal”
in an economic sense of maximizing the well-being of society. As a qualitative approach to
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incorporate potentially missing costs, Moreno-Cruz and Smulders [19] use a simple, gen-
eralized model to examine climate change policy in the presence of solar geoengineering.
They find that the optimal use of geoengineering depends on the potential harmful side
effects as well as how well solar geoengineering can counteract all the different sources of
climate change impacts. This reinforces the need for a better quantitative analysis of solar
geoengineering.
To perform a quantitative analysis of the optimal use of solar geoengineering, researchers
have turned to numerical techniques. The most frequently used technique adopted by re-
searchers in this section of the literature is dynamic analysis of integrated assessment mod-
els (IAM). The most widely used IAM among the solar geoengineering literature is the
dynamic integrated climate-economy model (DICE) developed by Nordhaus [20]. While
there are a variety of IAMs used in the literature, the main objective of each is to simu-
late the economic impacts of climate change over different policy scenarios by integrating
economic growth models with Earth system models. Using IAMs, researchers are able to
simulate the economic outcomes of different policy choices in prespecified time horizons
and then recursively develop an optimal policy path. It should be noted that the validity of
the conclusions of these models depend to a significant extent on the calibration of both the
economic growth models and the Earth system models. Most IAMs were designed for mit-
igation policy analysis, however, researchers have extended the models to examine optimal
climate policy in the presence of solar geoengineering as well as mitigation. Wigley [21]
uses the model for the assessment of greenhouse gas-induced climate change (MAGICC)
to examine the impact of varying degrees of solar geoengineering combined with various
levels of mitigation. Wigley [21] argues that a combination of solar geoengineering and
mitigation is better than either alternative alone or that solar geoengineering can limit the
impacts of climate change while mitigation is implemented. For a recent review of IAMs
and economic applications see Metcalf and Stock [22]. For a critique of IAMs see Pindyck
[23].
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The papers discussed above are a step in the right direction regarding the optimal role
of geoengineering in climate policy, but there are important factors of both geoengineering
and climate change that are not considered [19]. Specifically, there are many unknowns
and risks in the impacts of both climate change and solar geoengineering that persist due
to the complexity of Earth’s climate systems. Weitzman [24] and Pindyck [25] make an
argument that climate change may follow a fat-tailed probability distribution, meaning that
there may be a higher chance of extreme outcomes than most consider. As a result, they
argue that uncertainties should play a larger role in optimal climate policy. Researchers
have built dynamic stochastic programming into existing IAMs to incorporate different
sources of uncertainty and determine their impacts on optimal climate policy. Emmerling
and Tavoni [26] and Heutel et al. [27] use the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid
model (WITCH) and DICE IAMs, respectively, to analyze the optimal mitigation and solar
geoengineering levels in the presence of uncertainty. (For more information on the basics
of dynamic stochastic analysis see Bellman and Dreyfus [28] and Ross [29]. For economic
applications of dynamic stochastic analysis see Miranda and Fackler [30].) Emmerling
and Tavoni [26] consider uncertainty in the success of solar geoengineering, while Heutel
et al. [27] considers uncertainty in climate change and solar geoengineering. The results
of both studies indicate that at low levels of uncertainty solar geoengineering is preferred
to mitigation. This result is consistent with most engineering cost analyses, which come
to the same conclusion under the assumption of no uncertainty. However, as uncertainty
increases, they find that solar geoengineering becomes less preferred. Moreno-Cruz and
Keith [4] also find this strong relationship between uncertainty and optimal policy in a
theoretical analysis of mitigation in the presence of solar geoengineering and uncertainty.
These results suggest that most engineering cost analyses underestimate the costs of solar
geoengineering by not considering potential risks and uncertainties.
Weitzman [24] critiques the way uncertainty is introduced to IAMs in general by ar-
guing that the compounding of uncertainties is still underestimated, especially for extreme
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scenarios. In response to this criticism, some researchers have extended IAMs also to in-
clude the possibility of major adverse events in the climate change timeline, such as climate
tipping points or the sudden suspension of solar geoengineering. Climate tipping points are
distinct points of global climate change in which drastic changes occur that may be irre-
versible, such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet [31]. These tipping points are
predicted in growing strength by researchers in the existing climate change literature [32].
However, as the likelihood of experiencing one of these catastrophic events grows, it is still
uncertain where they will be experienced and the extent of economic damages if a tipping
point is crossed.
Bickel [33] and Heutel et al. [34] extend the DICE model to analyze the effects of
climate tipping points and solar geoengineering on optimal climate policy. These stud-
ies indicate that the presence of these climate tipping points actually leads to lower peak
temperatures and greenhouse gases in the optimal policy decisions than previous analy-
ses. In effect, because these tipping points may exist and are potentially nontrivial in their
economic damages, agents will increase mitigation levels earlier to try to prevent climate
change from reaching any of these tipping points, while solar geoengineering serves as an
insurance policy in case a tipping point is reached.
By not dealing with the root cause of climate change, the accumulation of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, researchers have predicted that a sudden suspension in the imple-
mentation of solar geoengineering could cause climate change to resume at a much quicker
pace than prior to the implementation of solar geoengineering [35]. This gives rise to two
additional sources of uncertainty to consider in the optimal choice of policy. The first is
the probability of a sudden suspension of solar geoengineering occurring. The other is the
extent of damages due to climate change resuming at an increased pace.
Similar to the climate tipping points literature, Goes et al. [36] extend Nordhaus’ DICE
model with the possibility of the sudden suspension of solar geoengineering to better under-
stand its impact on policy decisions. To simplify the analysis Goes et al. [36] assume that
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either mitigation or solar geoengineering can be used, but not a combination of both. Un-
der the assumptions made, the authors found that the presence of potential damages from
these uncertainties cause solar geoengineering to fail as a substitute for abatement over a
wide range of model specifications. Responding to Goes et al. [36], Bickel and Agrawal
[37] relax some of the assumptions made by Goes et al. [36]. Most importantly, they allow
for society to respond to a sudden suspension in solar radiation management through the
use of mitigation. Under this reframed model, the authors show that solar geoengineering
can pass a cost-benefit analysis more often than predicted by Goes et al. [36], but still less
often than suggested by previous studies that do not consider major adverse events like the
possibility of the sudden suspension of solar geoengineering.
By considering these major events, economists are able to inform the optimal policy
conversation. They suggest that existing studies, even those that try to broadly include
uncertainties, underestimate costs, and that by decreasing these uncertainties, solar geo-
engineering is more likely to play a more important role in optimal climate policy than it
should. The flip-side of the coin is that the best way to deal with geoengineering uncertain-
ties is by increasing the use of mitigation as a way to reduce the reliance on geoengineering.
In this way, later studies have shown that geoengineering and mitigation are complimentary
in dealing with climate uncertainties. The relationship of geoengineering and mitigation is
discussed further in section 2.5.
2.4 International Coordination and Cooperation
While it is important for researchers to improve the accuracy of optimal climate change
policy analyses to evaluate the role of solar geoengineering in the climate change discus-
sion, it is also important to analyze the international politics by relaxing the assumption of
a central, benevolent social planner. That is, researchers must examine strategic choices of
different actors rather than examining the optimal choice for a singular omniscient decision-
maker who acts to maximize the combined well-being of everyone. As evidenced by cur-
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rent international environmental agreements and climate treaties, such as the Kyoto Proto-
col, an understanding of optimal climate policy does not always translate into successful
implementation of those policies. One of the main shortfalls that has led to the low ambi-
tions and underwhelming results of existing climate treaties and environmental agreements
like the Kyoto Protocol has been the free-riding problem of mitigation [38]. However, as
further research and discussions of solar geoengineering make it a credible alternative or
supplement to mitigation, the possibility of solar geoengineering implementation has the
potential to transform the political problem of climate change implementation from one of
cooperation among countries to a simpler one of coordination and cost-sharing [3]. How-
ever, this potential for solar geoengineering implementation also introduces the problem of
free-driving, where any country has the ability to unilaterally implement geoengineering to
the benefit or detriment of others because of the low deployment costs [6]. This has spurred
economists to reanalyze the international politics and negotiations in the presence of solar
geoengineering.
Compounding with the problems of free-riding on mitigation and free-driving on solar
geoengineering and further complicating the international politics of climate change is the
heterogeneity in preferences across regions. Since it does not directly impact the accumu-
lation of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, the source of climate change damages, solar
geoengineering would differentially cool the planet. This gives rise to different regions
favoring different levels of solar geoengineering, wanting to “set the global thermostat”
to their preferred temperature. Additionally, solar geoengineering does nothing to counter
other damages from climate change such as ocean acidification. This leads to heterogeneity
in the persisting damages experienced by regions based on their geographical characteris-
tics [39]. In an evaluation of solar geoengineering, using a computable general equilibrium
model, Aaheim et al. [40] emphasize the importance of regional heterogeneity in their es-
timates of economic impact. The authors argue that this regional heterogeneity stems from
the economic impacts from solar geoengineering based on regional location as well as their
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primary economic activities. In optimal climate policy analysis, this heterogeneity can be
underestimated. While shifts toward a global optimal may be beneficial to society as a
whole, they may not be beneficial to each individual country. In economic terms, changes
toward the optimal climate policy need not be Pareto improvements. Countries may then
stand against the successful implementation of what is considered the optimal climate pol-
icy from a societal framework. Heterogeneous impacts, then, are central to the analysis of
the strategic interactions across countries.
To better understand the impact of solar geoengineering on international politics through
a framework of strategic decision making, Moreno-Cruz [41], Manoussi and Xepapadeas
[42], Urpelainen [43], and Millard-Ball [44] use game theoretical techniques (For more
information on the basics of game theory analysis in economics see Gibbons [45]). This
has allowed them to relax the assumption of a central, benevolent social planner and allow
for different actors to negotiate and interact in a strategic environment. Moreno-Cruz [41]
uses a simple two-country model in which the countries strategically choose their level of
mitigation, then their level of geoengineering, and finally experience damages based on the
mitigation and geoengineering choices of both countries. Under the model used, Moreno-
Cruz [41] finds that the levels of mitigation and geoengineering chosen depend on the de-
gree of symmetry between the countries. If countries are highly symmetric in their costs of
geoengineering and mitigation as well as their sensitivity to damages from temperature and
geoengineering, countries will mitigate suboptimal levels. However, if countries are highly
asymmetric in their damages, such that one country has a very low cost of geoengineering
and the other has a high sensitivity to geoengineering damages, the latter country may mit-
igate at inefficiently high levels relative to the level that maximizes the countries combined
well-being in order to reduce geoengineering by the former country. Manoussi and Xepa-
padeas [42] performs a similar analysis by examining a dynamic, calibrated two-country
model, and again demonstrates the importance of the degree of symmetry in the strategi-
cally chosen mitigation and geoengineering levels. Urpelainen [43] analyzes a two-country
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model in which both countries are strategically choosing mitigation and geoengineering
levels. He implies that the presence of geoengineering and the detriment it may cause in the
future can incentivize countries to increase emissions reductions in the present, similarly to
the asymmetric case of Moreno-Cruz [41]. Millard-Ball [44] considers more countries and
the possibility of an international environmental agreement. Millard-Ball [44] argues that
the credible threat of a country unilaterally implementing geoengineering may incentivize
countries to agree to higher mitigation levels than in current international environmental
agreements.
While Urpelainen [43] and Millard-Ball [44] concentrate on the threat of unilateral
implementation of solar geoengineering by individual countries incentivizing higher mit-
igation levels, Ricke et al. [46] considers the role of potential political consequences of
implementing solar geoengineering by requiring a majority coalition for implementation.
Ricke et al. [46] define a majority coalition as a coalition that has the majority share
of power, as represented by a variety of economic and political measures such as gross
domestic product. Using the heterogeneous preferences across 22 regions of the world,
Ricke et al. [46] simulate strategic coalition formation in which regions seek to form the
strongest, smallest coalition possible among regions with similar preferences. Comparing
this exclusive collation formation to an inclusive top-down approach, Ricke et al. [46] finds
the benefits of exclusivity to be small.
Following concurring engineering cost estimates exhibiting how low the deployment
costs of solar geoengineering could be, Victor [47]. Victor et al. [48], Barrett [3], Betz [49],
and Blackstock and Long [16] argue the importance of developing a governance structure
before any country or coalition acts unilaterally in their own interest to the detriment of
others by either implementing solar geoengineering, or in the case of Betz [49] by even
researching it as a future option. Betz [49] compares the free-rider problem on geoengi-
neering to the building of the Large Hadron Collider in Europe and the remaining stocks
of smallpox virus to emphasize that, unlike with mitigation, the governance problem is no
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longer one of getting countries to participate, but who should decide to implement geoengi-
neering and how it should be implemented. Building on his previous paper, Barrett [50]
provides a review of governance analyses, arguing that more work is needed. Virgoe [51]
examines three approaches to geoengineering governance: “through the United Nations, by
one state unilaterally, and through a consortium of states.” Virgoe [51] presents the pros and
cons of the different approaches and when they may arise. Importantly, Virgoe [51] also
notes that no existing international legal instruments “would pose an insuperable barrier
to geoengineering,” furthering the importance of quickly developing a governance struc-
ture prior to implementation. Weitzman [6] proposes a potential voting architecture for the
governance of geoengineering in which a qualified majority among countries is required to
increase or decrease the level of geoengineering. In addition to arguing the importance of
governance, Victor [47] argues that the existing top-down approach of encouraging broad
participation among countries used for current climate treaties and international agreements
will likely not be successful in the presence of solar geoengineering. Because countries or
small groups of countries could act unilaterally implement solar geoengineering, they may
have little incentive to join a large coalition. For this reason, Victor [47] argues researchers
need to investigate bottom-up coalition formation in which smaller groups of country coor-
dinate their decision to better understand coordination and governance, which is reflected
by the game theoretic analyses discussed above.
2.5 Road Ahead
In this paper, so far, we summarize the still nascent literature on the economics of solar
geoengineering to inform noneconomists in the field of the development and importance
of current economic thinking. As we show, economists were initially intrigued by the in-
credible economics of geoengineering following Crutzen [2]. Achieving any temperature
target at such low costs could change the game, making the free-driving problem irrelevant.
However, the same low costs introduce the possibility of a free-driver choosing a temper-
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ature goal without consideration of others, making solar geoengineering implementation
almost inevitable. However, economists have taken a step half-way back as they begin to
delve deeper and discover the various risks, uncertainties, and problems with international
politics of implementation. While economists have built on the work of other researchers to
provide insight and make important contributions to the areas of the solar geoengineering
literature discussed above, there is still more research to do. In this final section, we em-
phasize the importance of interdisciplinary research in the different directions of research
moving forward. We discuss areas of the literature that economists have just begun to ex-
plore, but need more contribution by economists and noneconomists alike moving forward
as well as areas that economists have identified as needing more from noneconomists to
continue.
An important aspect of the game theoretic analyses of international strategic deci-
sion making by Moreno-Cruz [41], Manoussi and Xepapadeas [52]. Urpelainen [43], and
Millard-Ball [44] as well as the generalized analyses by Moreno-Cruz and Smulders [19]
and Moreno-Cruz and Keith [4] is the trade-off between mitigation and geoengineering
when countries strategically choose their implementation levels. Each of these papers show
that this trade-off can have a large impact on the results of their analyses. In economics,
this trade-off is known as substitutability. Two products, like mitigation and geoengineer-
ing, are considered perfect substitutes if they can be used for the same purpose and perfect
complements if they must be used together. There are varying degrees of substitutability
in-between.
Some researchers have expressed concern about this trade-off through a moral hazard
framework. Lin [53], Morrow [54], Reynolds [55], and Preston [56] critically analyze this
potential moral hazard problem. Lin [53] argues that the geoengineering may undermine
mitigation efforts, creating a moral hazard problem. Morrow [54] address the question
of why the undermining of mitigation would be a bad by using three ethical approaches
to show conditions under which a moral hazard problem could arise. On the other side
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of the debate, Reynolds [55] and Preston [56] argue that empirical evidence suggests that
society may be better off reducing mitigation and implementing geoengineering. How-
ever, both admit that the empirical evidence is not necessarily accurate due to uncertainties
about the impacts and risks of solar geoengineering. As discussed by Reynolds [55], the
answer to this debate depends heavily on the substitutability of solar geoengineering and
mitigation as well as a better understanding of the potential risks of solar geoengineering
and climate change. While Moreno-Cruz and Smulders [19] make an argument that geo-
engineering can never be a perfect substitute for mitigation because it only deals with the
temperature-related impacts of climate change, further work closely examining and quan-
titatively estimating the substitutability of mitigation and solar geoengineering could be a
major contribution toward applying the results of these types of analyses.
In a similar vein of the ethics of geoengineering, some researchers have taken a step
further by questioning the intergenerational ethics of continuing research on solar geoengi-
neering. This branch of the literature has built off of what Gardiner [57] has called “arming
the future” in which by deciding whether or not to research geoengineering the current gen-
eration is deciding whether or not to “arm” future generations with the technology. This
section of the literature has been undecided in its conclusions. Burns [58] argues that the
potential risks of solar geoengineering as well as the potential limitation of future gener-
ations options by continuing to pursue this line of research causes further research into
geoengineering to fail in the framework of intergenerational equity. Robock [59] argues
that the “indoor,” theoretical and empirical modeling research of solar geoengineering re-
search is ethical, while the “outdoor” research of field tests is not. Betz [49] examines
both sides of the intergenerational ethics problem and argues that a reframing of the ques-
tion and applications of the research could reduce objections of further research. Against
this backdrop of possible futures, Goeschl et al. [60] analyzes this problem through an eco-
nomic framework. Goeschl et al. [60] model generations’ choices of whether to pursue and
implement solar geoengineering as a function of mitigation and solar geoengineering costs
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as well as potential resulting climate damages to strategically examine generations choices.
They find that the strategic decisions depend on the relative size of the parameters, but
importantly note that if solar geoengineering research is relatively cheap, the current gen-
eration may decide not to research solar geoengineering and increase mitigation. As shown
by the results of Goeschl et al. [60], research furthering our understanding of the risks and
costs of solar geoengineering research and implementation could help clarify this ethical
debate.
While the areas of growing research discussed above could benefit from future work by
economists and researchers in other fields alike, we appeal for interdisciplinary research in
areas that could benefit the literature that has been more developed by economists. First, as
with Keith et al. [5] we call for researchers to develop a better understanding of potential
uncertainties in solar geoengineering and climate change impacts alike. As discussed in
section 2.3, reducing the uncertainty of these impacts could greatly inform economic anal-
ysis of optimal climate policy. Second, we, along with Heyen et al. [39], Moreno-Cruz et
al. [4], and Manoussi and Xepapadeas [42], call for researchers to develop a better under-
standing of the heterogeneity of solar geoengineering and climate change impacts. This can
greatly benefit evaluations of solar geoengineering as well as our understanding of the in-
ternational politics of climate change. Finally, specific questions about liability, legitimacy,
and international cooperation need further study. Concurring with Victor [47], Victor et al.
[48], Barrett [3], Betz [49], and Blackstock and Long [16], we call for research analyzing
the governance and international politics of solar geoengineering and climate change. As
these authors indicate, solar geoengineering as a free-driver in the climate change discus-
sion has altered the dynamics of the problem, and progress is needed in understanding this
new state of the climate change conversation. As our understanding of the downsides of
solar geoengineering and climate change grows, we also need more work akin to Reynolds
[61] analyzing the role of liability or compensation for harm in international policy.
Economists have been at the forefront of the research in solar geoengineering, but a
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more careful and detailed analysis needs to be put forward. The best way to achieve this
is for economists to embrace this area and go play in the sandbox with other researchers
across all the disciplines currently involved in solar geoengineering research, and for other
disciplines to play along.
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CHAPTER 3
CLIMATE ECONOMETRIC MODELS INDICATE SOLAR GEOENGINEERING
WOULD REDUCE INTER-COUNTRY INCOME INEQUALITY
The following chapter is a reprint of a published paper:
Harding, A.R., Ricke, K., Heyen, D. et al. Climate econometric models indicate solar geo-
engineering would reduce inter-country income inequality. Nat Commun 11, 227 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-13957-x
Exploring heterogeneity in the economic impacts of solar geoengineering is a fun-
damental step towards understanding the risk tradeoff associated with a geoengineering
option. To evaluate impacts of solar geoengineering and greenhouse gas-driven climate
change on equal terms, we apply macroeconomic impact models that have been widely
applied to climate change impacts assessment. Combining historical evidence with climate
simulations of mean annual temperature and precipitation, we project socio-economic out-
comes under high anthropogenic emissions for stylized climate scenarios in which global
temperatures are stabilized or over-cooled by blocking solar radiation. We find impacts
of climate changes on global GDP-per-capita by the end of the century are temperature-
driven, highly dispersed, and model dependent. Across all model specifications, however,
income inequality between countries is lower with solar geoengineering. Consistent re-
duction in inter-country inequality can inform discussions of the distribution of impacts of
solar geoengineering, a topic of concern in geoengineering ethics and governance debates.
3.1 Introduction
Climate change poses many risks to society and natural ecosystems, and action will be re-
quired to reduce its harms [62]. While the most straightforward and certain way to reduce
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these harms is by reducing, and eventually reversing, emissions of greenhouse gases, such
mitigation is expensive and subject to free-rider incentives. The consequent inaction has
led to consideration of intentional intervention in the climate system through solar geoengi-
neering [63], but many are reluctant to pursue one global climate intervention to correct for
another [64, 65]. It is of paramount importance to understand, to the best of our abilities,
the relative global and distributional socio-economic impacts of all climate change options.
Solar geoengineering is the intentional reflection of solar radiation to reduce the tem-
perature effects of climate change. Until recently, understanding of the consequences of
blocking sunlight to cool the planet was limited in comparison to our understanding of the
effects of rising greenhouse gases. A decade of research has greatly increased our knowl-
edge of what the climate effects of solar geoengineering might look like [66, 67], but solar
geoengineering impacts assessment still lags behind evaluations of other types of climate
change [9]. This is for two reasons: first, the field is still relatively immature, and hence
the type of physical climate modeling results required to drive impacts models did not exist
until recently [68]. Second, the broader field of climate change impacts assessment has
evolved in a way that does not easily accommodate application to solar geoengineering.
For the sake of setting straightforward but meaningful climate policy targets, global or
regional temperature anomalies are often used as proxies for the level of impact or dam-
age [69], but with solar geoengineering, the correlations between temperature and other
impact-relevant variables such as precipitation and ocean pH may differ substantially from
the correlations between these variables under greenhouse gas-driven change [70]. This has
made it difficult to translate projected climate effects of solar geoengineering into impacts
on society using the standard frameworks used to compare, for example, a high and low
carbon dioxide emissions scenario.
In this paper, we examine the global and distributional impacts of solar geoengineer-
ing on socio-economic outcomes using a state-of-the-art macroeconomic climate impacts
assessment approach. This methodology, as developed by Dell et al. [71], Burke et al.
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[72], and Burke et al. [73], estimates the historical relationship between mean annual tem-
perature and precipitation and country-level growth in economic production measured as
gross domestic production (GDP) per capita. The empirically estimated climate-economy
relationship is then applied to stylized climate scenarios constructed from projections of
mean annual temperature and precipitation derived from multi-model ensembles of climate
change and solar geoengineering model simulations [74, 75, 76]. We then evaluate how so-
lar geoengineering may affect global economic growth and inter-country income inequality
by comparing global and country-level economic outcomes across scenarios.
The empirically estimated climate impact models we apply use mean annual tempera-
ture and precipitation to measure the relationship between the climate and the economy, as
measured by GDP. Factors such as climate variability and extremes are only captured by
this model to the extent that they are related to the climate indicators used in these models.
We cannot partition these effects from the aggregate effects using the empirical impacts es-
timation models we apply, and as such, considering the impact of these is outside the scope
of our analysis. However, recent work using a high-resolution forecast-oriented model
found that the type of solar geoengineering simulated in the GeoMIP simulation ensemble
(which we apply here as well) mediates precipitation extremes over 99.6% of grid cells and
reduces tropical cyclone intensity, not just mean climate response, supporting the assump-
tion that there is a strong relationship between reduction of mean anomalies and mitigation
of extremes [77]. Side-effects of solar geoengineering such as changes in ground-level UV
[78] as well as impacts of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on ocean acidification
[79, 80] are similarly not incorporated.
Empirical economic climate impacts estimation methods are an area of active research
and the extent to which projections applying such models can be reliably interpreted is
a matter of some dispute in the climate change economics community [81]. We remain
agnostic to this debate by applying a well-established methodology for climate change
impacts estimation [72, 73] to solar geoengineering in order to compare several illustra-
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tive future climate change scenarios with different levels of solar geoengineering on equal
terms. We conduct a broad sensitivity analysis using competing econometric model speci-
fications to illustrate which of our findings are contingent upon assumptions across various
state-of-the-art impacts models.
The econometric models we estimate capture a mixture of linear and non-linear effects,
different country trends, different climate variables, and growth and level effects. To allow
for the influence of different climate variables on economic production, we estimate models
with temperature and precipitation. As shown in Table A.1, temperature is the only climate
variable found to be statistically significant across all the models. Economic outcomes may
be delayed in their response to climate, so we estimate models with only contemporaneous
climate variables as well as models that include lagged climate variables up to 5 years.
Since it is unclear whether climate change impacts are on the level or growth of economic
output, we estimate both types of models. Microeconomic evidence suggests the impact of
temperature on outcomes follows a non-linear structure, so we estimate models both linear
and non-linear in climate variables [82, 83]. Finally, since countries may be following
different economic trends, we estimate models using country-level trends. Results for all
models can be found in the Supplementary Materials (Table A.1). In the text, we present
results for the model used in the text of Burke et al. [72], but comparable results for other
model specifications can be found in the Supplementary Materials (Table A).
Through this analysis, we find that the harms of warming and benefits of cooling both
accrue disproportionately to warmer, poor, more populous countries. As such, climate-
econometric models indicate that solar geoengineering would reduce inter-country income
inequality. While the magnitudes of the economic impact of greenhouse gas-driven warm-
ing and solar geoengineering-driven cooling are highly model dependent, their influences
on inter-country inequality are consistent.
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Four illustrative future climate scenarios
To comparatively evaluate the impacts solar geoengineering with climate change impacts,
we construct stylized climate scenarios from climate change and solar geoengineering pro-
jections widely used in impacts assessment. For projections of climate change without
solar geoengineering, we utilize grid-cell level projections of temperature and precipitation
by 2100 from the representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5, an emissions intensive
scenario and the highest warming pathway among RCPs [84]. Temperature and precipita-
tion responses for RCP8.5 are constructed from an ensemble mean of the climate models
participating in CMIP5. Projections of grid-cell temperature and precipitation responses
to solar geoengineering are constructed from climate model responses to the GeoMIP G1
experiment in which a solar reduction was used to offset CO2 forcing [85] (See the sec-
tion 3.4). Temperature and precipitation responses for solar geoengineering are constructed
from an ensemble mean of 12 climate models in the GeoMIP G1 experiment (Table A.2).
We also analyze climate impacts for each of the 12 climate models individually to examine
sensitivity to uncertainty in solar geoengineering climate response.
We integrate the RCP8.5 and solar geoengineering projections to simulate economic
growth under four illustrative future climate scenarios (Fig. 1). These four scenarios
are: no climate change, where a present-day climate is held constant, and the only sim-
ulated changes are the socioeconomic projections; RCP8.5, the highest warming scenario
simulated in the CMIP5 ensemble; geoengineering-stabilized RCP8.5, in which solar geo-
engineering is used to stabilize global mean temperature at its present-day level despite
the increased greenhouse gas concentrations associated with RCP8.5; and geoengineering-
mirrored RCP8.5, a scenario in which solar geoengineering is deployed to cool the global
mean temperature at the same rate of warming under RCP8.5 also despite the increased
greenhouse gas concentrations associated with RCP8.5. These stylized scenarios were de-
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signed to illustrate the comparison of solar geoengineering with RCP8.5, a climate change
scenario commonly utilized in climate change impact assessment.
Figure 3.1: Simulated changes in climate and projected GDP/capita over the 21st cen-
tury. Curves are estimated using the model in column (1) of Table A.1 for Shared Socioe-
conomic Pathway (SSP) 3. a Change in global mean temperature and b change in global
mean precipitation under the four illustrative climate scenarios. c Projected GDP/capita for
the four illustrative climate scenarios where lines represent median projections and shaded
area represents 95% confidence (See the section 3.4). See Table A for other SSPs, climate-
economy model specifications (Figure A.12).
A baseline economic growth scenario is required to apply the empirical climate impact
function in projections. We use the shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) that project
key socio-economic factors such as population and economic development contingent upon
challenges to adaptation and mitigation of climate change [86]. In the text, we present the
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results for outcomes under SSP3, the pathway associated with high challenges to both
mitigation and adaptation—the conditions under which solar geoengineering seems most
likely to be needed. Results for all four illustrative climate scenarios and all five SSPs can
be found in the Supplementary Materials.
Changes in global temperature and precipitation for the four climate scenarios are dis-
played in Fig. 1a, b. The relative effects on temperature and precipitation as well as the
spatial heterogeneity of impacts from solar geoengineering do not match those of anthro-
pogenic climate change (see Figure A.1). Solar geoengineering reduces global precipitation
more per degree of cooling than CO2 and other greenhouse gases increase it per degree of
warming. Uniformly applied solar geoengineering also overcools equatorial regions rela-
tive to the poles.
3.2.2 Macroeconomic impacts of solar geoengineering
When the economic impacts of solar geoengineering are estimated using the same historical
evidence used to project harms from greenhouse gas-driven warming, we observe impact
model-dependent results. Following the approach of Burke et al. [72, 73], we find that solar
geoengineering to stabilize global temperature mitigates the economic harms of warming-
associated climate change and even provides a modest increase in global GDP (Fig. 1c).
This increase is the result of the more zonally uniform global temperatures associated with
canceling CO2 radiative forcing with solar forcing. If anthropogenic warming is not just
eliminated but solar geoengineering is used to cool the planet at a rate equal to the RCP8.5
warming rate, global GDP increases substantially due to rapid economic growth in warmer
developing nations (Fig. 2b). This increase in global GDP is the result of cooling the areas
of the world with high population densities that are currently warmer-than-optimal. How-
ever, these results are sensitive to econometric model specification. Figure A.12 shows that
global economic growth varies across econometric specifications as well as socioeconomic
pathways.
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Global results mask considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of economic losses
and gains. Projections under the no-climate-change scenario and the geoengineering-stabilized
RCP 8.5 scenario are similar in terms of country-level outcomes (Fig. 2c, d); no country
is poorer by the end of the century than in 2010 for either scenario (Table A.3). As pro-
jected by Burke et al. [72], under RCP8.5 and SSP3, 43% of countries are poorer at the end
of the century and 76% of countries are relatively poorer than they would be under SSP3
alone. Using the same impacts model, we find that under the geoengineering-mirrored
RCP8.5 scenario, just 11% of countries are poorer at the end of the century and 32% of
countries are relatively poorer than they would be under SSP3 alone. As shown by Fig-
ures Figure A.23 to Figure A.36 in the Supplementary Materials, the identity of countries
that experience economic losses and the magnitude of their absolute or relative losses also
varies across models.
3.2.3 Solar geoengineering and inter-country income inequality
From our projections we analyze differences in country-level incomes, as measured by
GDP, as a metric of global income inequality. Changes in climate from climate change
or solar geoengineering can additionally impact inequality across communities within the
boundaries of a country. This is an important consideration for a comprehensive analysis
of the impacts on inequality, however, because the models we use are identified on country-
level GDP, we cannot analyze the impact on inequalities within a country’s borders. The
effects of each scenario on country-level economic growth, inequality, and the percentage
of countries absolutely or relatively poorer varies across economic impact model spec-
ifications (see Tables Table A.3 and Table A.4). However, unlike projections of global
economic growth over the next century, projections of global income inequality are quali-
tatively consistent across models, suggesting that using solar geoengineering to negate or
reverse climate change can reduce global income inequality.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative share of global GDP vs. the cumulative share of the
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global population (known as a Lorenz curve) in 2099 for the baseline SSP3 scenario. Ab-
sent consideration of climate change, most long-term economic projections anticipate some
degree of country-level income convergence over the coming century, that is, a narrowing
of the global income distribution over time. This is illustrated by the black curve. With no
climate change, an end-of-century Lorenz curve is less convex than that of the present day
(gray dashed line), indicating a decrease in global income inequality. These gains in equal-
ity are eliminated under RCP8.5 but are restored in a geoengineering-stabilized climate.
Global cooling further increases income convergence, except in the lowest-wealth quartile.
(For example, the poorest country in 2100 under the geoengineering-mirrored climate is
Mongolia with $316/capita, a decrease from $860/capita in 2010.) Figure A.47 displays
the Lorenz curves across different model specifications.
3.2.4 Sensitivity analysis and robustness
In Fig. 4 we display the percentage of countries that gain relative to no climate change
and the Gini coefficients for country GDP/capita in 2099 for the different econometric
models and illustrative climate scenarios under SSP3. Gini coefficients are a widely used
measure of inequality, related to the curvature of the Lorenz curves in Fig. 3, where a
lower Gini coefficient indicates lower inequality. Despite significantly disparate models
of how climate impacts economic growth, several consistent trends emerge. RCP8.5 (or-
ange) consistently increases inter-country inequality and the percentage of countries with
poor economic growth, whereas the geo-mirrored scenario (purple) consistently decreases
inequality. For all impact models, the Gini coefficient decreases with the use of solar
geoengineering. The coefficient is the lowest for the Geoengineering-Mirrored RCP 8.5
scenario. Under all but one economic impacts model, the Geoengineering-Mirrored RCP
8.5 scenario decreases the percentage of countries with a GDP loss relative to RCP8.5, and
under that particular model (Model 5, an income-dependent growth model with no country
time trends), geoengineering has a particularly large effect on reducing inequality.
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While the effects of climate change and solar geoengineering on convergence varies
somewhat depending upon the socioeconomic scenario and economic impact model speci-
fication, results indicate that anthropogenic warming consistently hinders or even reverses
convergence, whereas solar geoengineering enhances or accelerates it. Solar geoengineer-
ing is not perfectly equitable in countering climate change in terms of key climate indica-
tors, but it is more equitable in economic outcomes than under a no climate change scenario
[87]. These results display a consistent decrease in global income inequality with solar geo-
engineering across economic model specification. Likewise, this result is consistent among
all SSPs.
The underlying econometric models have very different assumptions that can explain
both the wide range of future global production and simultaneously the consistency of so-
lar geoengineering’s impact on global income inequality across model specification. In
both cases, it is the impact on economic growth in poorer countries that drive faster eco-
nomic growth under some models and consistently reduce global income inequality across
all models. For example, under model specifications that are quadratic in climate vari-
ables, poorer countries, which represent a large fraction of the world’s population, initially
have temperatures several degrees above the estimated optimal temperature. Reducing
global temperatures does little to change outcomes for richer countries clustered around
the temperature optimum because of relative insensitivity to marginal changes in tempera-
ture around the optimum. However, countries far from the optimum can experience large
gains due to the non-linear relationship between temperature and the economy. In linear
model specifications, it is a similar mechanism where initially poorer countries drive in-
come convergence because estimates find that only poorer countries are sensitive to changes
in climate. Additionally, masking CO2-driven warming with solar reduction reduces the
equator-to-pole temperature gradient, bringing all countries’ climates slightly closer.
This analysis only captures the projected economic effects of anthropogenic warming
and solar geoengineering that are associated with annual-mean temperature and precipita-
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tion, two commonly reported climate indicators which were used to calibrate the empirical
impacts models applied. Changes to annual mean temperature and precipitation are closely
related to changes in extremes, both for GHG-driven warming [88] and solar geoengi-
neering [77]. Impacts unaddressed by solar geoengineering, such as ocean acidification
and CO2 fertilization, and side-effects such as changes in ground-level UV, are potentially
important factors in the economic assessment of both solar geoengineering and conven-
tional climate change. Likewise, effects such as variability in extremes and sea level rise
that may be addressed by solar geoengineering are outside of the scope of the empirical
methodologies applied in this analysis. However, even a conservative interpretation of
studies of the economic impacts associated with ocean acidification [79, 80, 89] and ele-
vated ground-level UV [90], seem to indicate such costs would be small compared to the
temperature-driven impacts of climate change.
3.2.5 Uncertainty about the significance of precipitation changes
The impacts that solar geoengineering may have on global and regional hydrological change
has been a focus of considerable study and concern over the past decade [91, 92, 18, 93].
This study and others have found limited effects of precipitation on economic growth [71,
94, 95], meaning our projected outcomes are mainly driven by temperature. Both green-
house gas-driven warming and solar geoengineering are expected to decouple the historical
regional relationships between temperature and precipitation in a way that is not necessarily
well-accommodated by empirical impacts models. While historically, annual precipitation
and temperature are negatively correlated most areas over land (Fig. 5a), the sign of the
projected relationship between precipitation and temperature changes for nearly half of all
countries in the analysis (Fig. 5b, c). Lack of cross-sectional variation in correlations could
prove problematic when projections are then made using a model that includes country
fixed effects [96, 97] in which the value of a base climate state are aggregated with the
value of non-physical properties such as economic and political institutions.
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To examine the impacts of uncertainty about precipitation responses to solar geoengi-
neering on economic outcomes, we apply the 12 individual GeoMIP climate ensemble
members (Table A.2) to project GDP per capita for each climate model individually. Cli-
mate variable output from individual model ensemble members span a broader range of
temperature and precipitation responses, which translates into greater uncertainty in global
economic impacts (Figure A.50). However, across projections for each of the climate mod-
els, our finding that solar geoengineering reduces global income inequality still holds (Ta-
ble A.5). Further, when we apply the ensemble mean temperature response and only vary
precipitation response across solar geoengineering climate models to analyze sensitivity to
uncertainty in the hydrological impact of solar geoengineering, we find little variation in
economic impacts for the different models (Figure A.53). This suggests that, counter to
common conceptions about solar geoengineering impacts, uncertainty about temperature
responses is a more important driver of uncertainty about economic impacts than uncer-
tainty about precipitation responses.
3.3 Discussion
Our findings indicate a potentially large global economic gain from solar geoengineer-
ing, if implemented. This does not necessarily indicate that a globally governed deploy-
ment strategy would resemble our stylized scenarios. Heterogeneous impacts suggest that
the scenario with greatest global economic growth may not be politically feasible under
a globally governed system. Furthermore, the scenario with the largest global economic
gains is associated with relative losses for the lowest wealth quartile (Fig. 3). Using the
methodology employed in this analysis to evaluate potential solar geoengineering by dif-
ferent governance structures, or lack thereof, are important topics for future research but
beyond the scope of this paper.
For purposes of this analysis we generated stylized geoengineering scenarios based on
those that have been widely used by climate modelers because our interest is to explore
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how extreme geoengineering might affect economic growth and inequality. Among the
many additional important questions that are beyond the scope of the analysis is how the
exact kinds of geoengineering interventions might affect these same outcomes. Already in
the broader literature, some scholars have imagined ideal global geoengineering schemes
while others see geoengineering emerging in more haphazard ways—initially with actions
by governments that may act unilaterally and then, later, with a wider group that sees
systemic responses as better than uncoordinated unilateral actions [48, 51, 98, 99]. Under-
standing whether and how these different kinds of deployment scenarios impact outcomes
an important topic for future research [100].
Finally, these conclusions are dependent on the historically trained climate-econometric
models being valid in predicting future impacts of geoengineering, but if these models are
not valid for geoengineering, we should also expect them to also be invalid for GHG-
driven climate change. As macroeconomic analyses have become a standard tool for cli-
mate change impact [71, 72, 73, 83], it is essential to apply these same tools to evaluate the
impacts of solar geoengineering in order to evaluate policy alternatives on equal footing. If
our application and results induce skepticism, this may indicate that the empirical macroe-
conomic impacts assessment approach is inappropriate to apply in projecting future climate
damages in general, whether solar geoengineering is a component of that future change or
not. If this modeling approach accurately identifies the climate-economy relationship inde-
pendent of the driving cause of climate variation, then empirical macroeconomic impacts
models suggest that, depending on how it is ultimately deployed, if ever, solar geoengi-
neering could potentially ameliorate some of the projected economic impacts of warming.
There is no apparent reason that this empirical modeling approach and resulting climate
change impact projections would be appropriate to apply in one instance and not the other.
Our results are not consistent with several prevailing concerns about the potential im-
pacts of climate geoengineering: that solar geoengineering favors developed countries over
developing ones, that it would have large residual economic impacts, or that maintaining a
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climate close to present day is clearly preferable [39]. There are substantial uncertainties
associated with the models applied in this study, but the reduction of inter-country inequal-
ity is consistent across all socioeconomic scenario, climate model and economic model
combinations. The insignificance of precipitation that is suggested by empirical impacts
models results renders large hydrological changes associated with solar geoengineering
unimportant even if intuitively this appears to be a highly consequential side effect. These
inconsistencies between solar geoengineering impact assessment and state-of-the-art cli-
mate econometrics need to be addressed and resolved in order to provide a sound basis for
climate risk mitigation decision-making.
We have presented results based on stylized scenarios that are unlikely to be politically
or legally feasible. However, the strategic incentives implied by the results highlights the
need for further work on the global governance of solar geoengineering. Following the
extensive body of literature on solar geoengineering governance [101], our findings under-
score that a robust system of global governance will be necessary to ensure that any future
decisions about solar geoengineering deployment are made for collective benefit.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Climate projections
The projections of anthropogenic climate change are an ensemble mean of the change in
precipitation and near-surface temperature in 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 from all
global climate models participating in CMIP5 (Figure A.1). The grid-cell level climate
projections are aggregated to the country-level population-weighted means by using the
grid-cell level distribution of the global population in 2000 (Figure A.1). We interpolate
annual climate change for RCP 8.5 under the assumption that temperature and precipita-
tion follow a constant linear trend from 2010 through 2100 [72]. This is consistent with
temperature and precipitation trends under RCP 8.5.
The projections of changes in temperature and precipitation from solar geoengineer-
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ing are constructed from the ensemble mean of 12 models contributing to GeoMIP (Ta-
ble A.2) [85, 102, 103]. These projections represent the respective change in each climate
indicator for a degree Celsius decrease in global temperature from solar geoengineering
(Figure A.1; note that the shift in equator-to-pole temperature gradient may be different for
different solar geoengineering strategies). Solar geoengineering projections are aggregated
to country-level population-weighted means using the population distribution in 2000 [72].
In our illustrative scenarios, we consider two levels of solar geoengineering. The first,
Geoengineering-Stabilized RCP 8.5, deploys solar geoengineering to counter increases in
the global mean temperature from RCP 8.5 to stabilize the global mean temperature at
2010 levels throughout the 21st century. The second, Geoengineering-Mirrored RCP 8.5,
deploys solar geoengineering to decrease the global mean temperature at the same rate it
would increase under RCP 8.5 without any solar geoengineering. These two scenarios are
illustrated in Fig. 1a, b.
3.4.2 Economic impact function
Our impact function estimations start with direct replications of Dell et al. [71], Burke et
al. [72, 73]. For the econometric estimation of the historical climate-economy relationship,
we follow the approach of Burke et al. [72]. Using historical data on interannual and
inter-country variation in annual average temperature and precipitation from 1960–2010
for 165 countries [104] and GDP per capita [105], they estimate the historical non-linear
relationship between key climate indicators and growth in GDP per capita. (See Table A.1
for regression results.)
3.4.3 Economic projections
For the economic projections, we follow the approach of Burke et al. [72] with a small
extension. The economic projection consists of three steps. The first step is to select
one of the five SSPs. This choice of an SSP determines, for each of the 165 countries, a
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baseline projection of population and per capita GDP growth for each year between 2010
and 2099 [86]. This baseline projection implicitly assumes that climate indicators do not
change over the course of the century and therefore represents the growth profile in the no-
climate-change scenario. The second step (for the remaining three scenarios that feature
a change in climate conditions) is to iteratively adjust, for each country separately, the
growth projection according to changes in climate indicators. The basis for this adjustment
is the impact function (see Economic Impact Function above) that describes the historical
climate-economy relationship. For a given year, the growth rate is modified upwards or
downwards according to a country’s position on the climate impact function in that year
relative to their climate in 2010. In this way, we obtain a growth profile over time for
each country. Finally, the third step of the economic projection is to apply these annual
growth rates to the initial GDP/capita of each country in 2010 to evaluate each country’s
GDP/capita throughout the century.
3.4.4 Uncertainty analysis
To test consistency of our findings across specifications of the climate-economy relation-
ship we estimate multiple impact models. While in the main text we follow the model used
in the text of Burke et al. [72], the Supplementary Materials show results for a variety
of alternative specifications. While the specification used in the text follows the assump-
tion that growth rates only depend on present climate conditions, we also estimate models
where economic impacts depend on climate conditions in the previous five years (lagged).
In addition to using uniform impact function (pooled), we allow response functions to vary
across countries by estimating models with a separate climate-economy relationship for
rich and poor countries. While microeconomic evidence suggests a non-linear response
structure to temperature, we estimate both linear and non-linear model specifications. Fi-
nally, since it is unclear whether the climate-economy relationship impacts levels or growth
of economic output, we estimate both types of model.
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To account for uncertainty in the estimated historical response functions, we use a boot-
strap estimation of the econometric impact functions (N = 1000) in which countries are
sampled with replacement. For median results, we use the 50% quantile projections. To
describe 95% confidence intervals, we use 2.5% and 97.5% quantile results.
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Figure 3.2: County-level income projections over the 21st century with and without
solar geoengineering. Results are estimated using the model in column (1) of Table A.1 for
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP3. Projected percent gain in GDP per capita by 2100
relative to no climate changes for: a Geoengineering-mirrored RCP8.5, b RCP8.5, and c
Geoengineering-stabilized RCP8.5 scenario. d the transient evolution of GDP per capita
for each country over time under geoengineering-mirrored RCP8.5 and RCP8.5, as well
as e the Geoengineering-stabilized RCP8.5 and SSP3 without climate change. Each line
represents a specific country with color representing the country’s initial GDP per capita in
2010. See Supplementary Materials for other SSPs, climate-economy model specifications
(Figures Figure A.23 and Figure A.36).
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Figure 3.3: Lorenz curves of global income distribution in 2100. Curves are esti-
mated using the model in column (1) of Table A.1 for Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
(SSP) 3. Cumulative global income vs. cumulative global population, with global warm-
ing (RCP8.5, orange), no warming, geoengineering stabilized global temperature (geo-
stabilized, green) and global cooling (geo-mirrored, purple). Lorenz curve for present day
income distribution is indicated by dashed line. The distribution that would be observed
with perfect equality is represented by the dotted line. See Supplementary Materials for
other SSPs, climate-economy model specifications (Figure A.47).
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of countries with a relative loss compared to no climate change
versus country-level Gini Coefficients in 2099. Values represent median projections for
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 3 for RCP8.5 (orange), geoengineering-stabilized RCP8.5
(green) and geoengineering-mirrored RCP8.5 (purple) simulations. Numbers represent
models specified as follows: Model 1 estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic tem-
perature and precipitation, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. Model
2 estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation and lags up to 5
years, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. Model 3 estimates a growth
model with quadratic temperature and precipitation for rich and poor countries separately,
year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. Model 4 estimates a growth model
with quadratic temperature and precipitation for rich and poor countries separately lagged
up to 5 years, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. Model 5 estimates a
growth with linear temperature separately for rich and poor countries, region-year fixed ef-
fects, and no country time trend. Model 6 estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic
temperature, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. Model 7 estimates a
pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed ef-
fects, and no country time trend. Model 8 estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic
temperature and precipitation lagged up to 5 years, region-year fixed effects, and no country
time trend. Model 9 estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic temperature and pre-
cipitation, region-year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. Model 10 estimates
a pooled levels model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, year fixed effects, and
a quadratic country time trend. Model 11 estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic
temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend.
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Figure 3.5: Historical and projected relationship between surface temperature and
annual precipitation. a Historical correlation between temperature and precipitation.
Change in precipitation relative to change in temperature projected by b a CMIP5 en-
semble for RCP8.5 and by c a GeoMIP ensemble for solar geoengineering to reduce the
global the mean temperature by an equal amount as the warming under RCP8.5. The sign
of the projected relationship between precipitation and temperature changes for 76 of 165
countries under RCP8.5 and 73 of 165 countries under solar geoengineering.
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CHAPTER 4
FROM MICRO-LEVEL WEATHER SHOCKS TO MACROECONOMIC
IMPACTS
Macroeconomic empirical studies have consistently found the US, along with other de-
veloped economies, to be insensitive to weather shocks. This stands in direct contrast to
prevailing microeconomic empirical findings. In this paper, I provide evidence that this
empirical paradox is a consequence of the industrial composition and spatial distribution of
economic activity in the US. I introduce weather shocks into a general equilibrium model
and show that microeconomic labor productivity shocks driven by local weather fluctu-
ations aggregate according to established growth accounting methods. I then construct
estimates of the annual macroeconomic impacts of microeconomic weather shocks across
3,080 counties and 14 NAICS 2-digit industries in the US from 2002 to 2017 according to
the growth accounting framework. I first estimate a historical relationship between weather
and labor productivity growth at the county-by-industry level. I find evidence of significant
but heterogeneous sensitivity to weather shocks at the microeconomic level. However, after
aggregating across the industrial composition and spatial distribution of economic activity
this sensitivity becomes masked by the aggregation. This result suggests that macroeco-
nomic impact estimates may obscure important underlying heterogeneity in weather im-
pacts.
4.1 Introduction
Precise measurement of the economic impacts of climate is a pressing issue in the face
of climate change. To better understand the potential future impacts of climate change,
recent empirical analyses estimate a historical relationship between climate, or more of-
ten weather, and economic activity. These studies typically approach the measurement of
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impacts from distinctly microeconomic or macroeconomic perspectives. For the US, and
other developed economies, these two perspectives have come to contrasting conclusions.
Microeconomic studies examine causal relationships and mechanisms for the impact
of climate on a variety of economic outcomes. These microeconomic analyses have found
causal evidence of an impact of weather on agricultural yields [106, 82, 107] and labor
productivity in industries with high climate exposure [108]. Focusing on the human phys-
iological impacts of weather, recent evidence suggests that temperature causally impacts
human capital formation [109]. These studies suggest that, at a microeconomic scale, fac-
tors and drivers of US economic activity can be sensitive to weather.
Macroeconomic studies, however, find the US and other developed economies to be
insensitive to weather. In seminal work, Dell et al. (2012) and Burke et al. (2015) examine
the impact of country-level weather on the growth of GDP per capita [71, 72]. Dell et
al. (2012) find a significant impact of temperature on economic growth for poor countries
only. Burke et al. (2015) find a non-linear relationship between temperature and economic
growth with significant impacts only for countries hotter or colder than the peak growth
temperature of around 13◦C. Both studies find that the US, along with other rich countries
in the case of Dell et al. (2012) and countries with similar temperatures in the case of Burke
et al. (2015), are insensitive to weather. This insensitivity to weather for the US is robust to
other measures and drivers of economic growth, including employment, capital stock, and
total factor productivity [110, 111].
I develop a theoretical framework that introduces localized weather through its effect
on the labor productivity of region-industry pairs. Applying this framework, I describe how
the microeconomic impact of local weather shocks across the industrial composition and
spatial distribution of economic activity translates into macroeconomic impacts in equilib-
rium. I find that the equilibrium macroeconomic impacts of a micro-level weather shock
depend on a region-industry’s sensitivity to weather shocks, the size of the weather shock,
and the size of the region-industry, measured as their value-added share of GDP. This result
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is consistent with previous findings in the growth accounting literature [112]. Applying this
result, I construct macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks across the US by aggregating
their estimated microeconomic impacts.
Information on the historical size of weather shocks and the size of region-industries
can be directly observed in data. However, the sensitivity of labor productivity to weather
shocks at a microeconomic scale is unobserved, so I empirically estimate the relationship.
I estimate a historical relationship between weather and novelly constructed labor produc-
tivity growth measures at the county-industry level for 3,080 US counties and 15 NAICS
2-digit industries from 2002 to 2017. To establish causal inference, I follow recent litera-
ture in applying panel data fixed effects methods [83]. At the microeconomic level, I find
evidence of a heterogeneous, statistically significant, and non-linear impact of changes in
temperature and precipitation on labor productivity growth. Sensitivity is largest for in-
dustries whose labor is typically more exposed to climate, such as the agriculture, mining,
construction, and utilities industries. Counties that are richer and colder tend to be less
sensitive to changes in weather.
Combining empirically estimated sensitivities of county-industry pairs to local weather
shocks with data on the size of weather shocks and the size of county-industries as a frac-
tion of GDP, I construct annual estimates of the macroeconomic impact of micro-level
weather shocks by aggregating across the industrial composition and spatial distribution of
economic activity according to the findings of my theoretical framework. I find that the
sign and size of the macroeconomic impacts vary over the sample period, however annual
macroeconomic impacts are consistently statistically insignificant. Decomposing macroe-
conomic impacts into county, industry, and county-industry contributions, I show that the
significance of weather shocks diminishes when aggregated. This finding highlights the im-
portance of considering underlying heterogeneity in macroeconomic weather shock impact
estimates.
This paper contributes to bridging the gap between micro-level and macro-level analy-
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ses of climate impacts by providing a simple theoretical framework for aggregating micro-
level shocks into macro-level impacts. The most closely related research is [113], who
find that the spatial aggregation of highly heterogeneous precipitation levels within a coun-
try explains the lack of statistical significance of rainfall in macroeconomic analyses. The
results of this paper build on this finding by showing that the spatial and industrial aggrega-
tion of highly heterogeneous weather shock impacts within a country can explain the lack
of statistical significance of weather shocks in macroeconomic analyses.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2 I present a general equilibrium theoretical
framework that introduces weather shocks through local labor productivity. In section 4.3 I
apply the equilibrium of the model to examine the aggregate impact of micro-level weather
shocks. In section 4.4 I describe the data and empirical methods used to estimate a historical
relationship between weather and labor productivity growth in the US and in section 4.5
I present the results of those estimates. In section 4.6 I apply the theoretical findings of
section 4.3 to aggregate the empirical estimates from section 4.5. In section 4.7 I conclude.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
A causal relationship between weather, often measured as temperature, and productivity
has been well documented by empirical microeconomic studies. At the individual, firm,
and regional level, these studies find a causal relationship between weather and productivity
for different productivity measures, such as labor productivity, agricultural yield, and total
factor productivity, across different industries [82, 114, 107, 115, 109, 116]. However, it
is less clear how these microeconomic weather-driven productivity shocks aggregate into
macroeconomic fluctuations.
Here, I introduce a general equilibrium theoretical framework where local weather
shocks enter through labor productivity to demonstrate how local microeconomic weather
shock impacts aggregate to generate macroeconomic fluctuations. The key contribution
of this framework is to provide a concise and tractable description of how the microeco-
48
nomic impacts of local weather shocks aggregate to generate macroeconomic fluctuations
in an economy. The model identifies important channels for spillovers in impacts, such as
through common labor markets and trade in intermediate inputs, which are important for
the empirical identification of weather impacts as well as distributional outcomes.
I begin with a static multisector model of the economy has two sets of actors: producers
and households [117, 118]. Households, characterized by a single representative consumer
for the economy, inelastically provide labor to producers and consume final goods. To
allow for differential weather shocks across space within the economy, I extend the model
by disaggregating production across N industries and R regions. Each producer in the
economy is considered to produce a distinct good based on their industry and regional
location. Weather shocks are modeled to impact the economy through a supply-side shock
to the labor productivity of firms local to the weather shock. In this framework, labor is
modeled as the only primary factor of production, though the results are generalizable to
productivity shocks to other factors of production [119].
4.2.1 Households
A homogeneous mass of households in the economy is characterized by a representative
consumer with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences for final goods and
services. Households’ sole source of income is from labor. Households inelastically sup-
ply labor endowment L̄ and receive income M = wL̄ based on an economy-wide wage
rate w. The representative consumer’s consumption is derived from the following utility
maximization problem.























where U is the total utility of the representative consumer, cir is the consumption of final
goods from industry i and region r, αir represents the households’ tastes for the distinct
goods and services, and pir is the price of the final good.
From the consumer’s utility maximization problem in Equation (Equation 4.1), I derive
the consumer’s demand for each distinct final good produced in an industry i and region r






















To analyze how micro-level shocks aggregate across industries and space, production in the
economy is disaggregated across N industries and R regions. A representative producer
for each industry-region pair produces a distinct good or service. With a constant-returns-
to-scale CES production technology, producers choose combinations of labor, the only
primary factor of production, and intermediate inputs to minimize costs. Producers are
assumed to operate in a competitive market and take prices and the economy-wide wage
rate as given.
To introduce weather into the model, I assume that labor productivity, Air, of each
representative producer in industry i and region r is a function of the weather in their region.
This follows microeconomic evidence that labor productivity is sensitive to weather. For
now, I do not assume any functional form for how weather impacts labor productivity, but
I do assume that the sensitivity of labor productivity to local weather is flexibly individual
to each producer.
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where γir is the labor share parameter,Air(Wr) is labor productivity, Lir is labor input, ωjsir
is the share parameter for intermediate inputs from representative producers in industries
j and regions s, xjsir is intermediate inputs from producers js, and σ is the elasticity of
substitution.1
Given their production technology, each representative firm chooses labor and interme-
diate inputs given wage and prices to minimize their costs. The cost minimization problem































From the first-order conditions for the cost minimization problems given by Equation































1The elasticity of substitution is assumed to be the same as the elasticity of substitution in the consumer’s
utility function to allow for a closed solution. This assumption does not meaningfully change the results of
the model. The appendix shows robust results for the empirics of this paper across a range of elasticities.
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4.2.3 Equilibrium
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the economy, I introduce a key economic measure
called the Leontief Inverse matrix, given by
L = [I−Ω]−1 (4.8)
where I is the identity matrix and Ω, known as the direct requirements matrix, is a ma-
trix composed of the intermediate input share parameters ωjsir. The Leontief Inverse is a
measure of the direct and indirect interdependence of an economy. Elements Ljsir of the
Leontief Inverse capture the use, both direct and indirect, of output from a producer js to
produce a unit of output for producer ir.
Equations (Equation 4.1) and (Equation 4.4) fully describe the objectives of households
and producers in the economy subject to the constraints they face. Following these objec-
tives, the general equilibrium of the competitive economy is described as a collection of
prices, quantities, and wage such that the following four conditions are satisfied:
1. (Perfect Competition) Markets are perfectly competitive, so equilibrium prices equal
marginal cost, pir = µir ∀i, r.
2. (Utility Maximization) The representative consumer chooses consumption cir to
solve the budget constrained utility maximization problem in Equation (Equation 4.1)
given equilibrium prices pir.
3. (Cost Minimization) Representative producers choose factor demands Lir and xjsir
to solve the cost minimization problem in Equation (Equation 4.4) subject to their
production technology given equilibrium prices pir.
4. (Market Clearing) Markets for output of each region-sector pair and the labor mar-













I first solve for equilibrium prices in the economy by applying the assumption of perfectly
competitive markets. Setting the price of output equal to marginal cost, as given in Equation




In equilibrium, price of an industry’s output depends on the equilibrium wage rate, the
elasticity of substitution, the productivity adjusted labor share parameter, γ∗ir = γirAir(Wr)
σ−1,
and the Leontief Inverse. Together, the price of output for a producer is determined by the
price of labor and the producer’s direct and indirect demand for labor inputs.
Equilibrium Output
Next, I solve for an equilibrium measure of output by applying the market clearing condi-
tion for the output of producers. Specifically, I multiply both sides of the output market-
clearing condition by pσir, substitute final and intermediate input demand from Equations
(Equation 4.2) and (Equation 4.5) and solve for output measure pσiryir. In vector form, this
gives
Pσ  Y = LαM (4.10)
where , called the Hadamard product, represents the element-wise multiplication of ma-
trices.
In equilibrium, output depends on household income, M, household tastes, αir, and
the Leontief Inverse. Together, the output of a producer is determined by the income of
households and their demand, both direct and indirect, for output from the producer.
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Equilibrium Wage Rate
Finally, I solve for the equilibrium economy-wide wage rate by applying the labor mar-
ket clearing condition. Substituting conditional labor demand, given in Equation (Equa-
tion 4.6), into the equation for household income, M = wL̄, I find the economy-wide








In equilibrium, the economy’s wage rate depends on the elasticity of substitution, the
productivity-adjusted labor share, households’ tastes, and the Leontief Inverse. Together,
the equilibrium wage, or the price of labor, is determined by the demand, both direct and
indirect, for labor, which is captured by the demand, both direct and indirect, for output
from producers and the share of labor in those producers’ output.
4.3 Comparative Statics
Having characterized the general equilibrium of the economy, in this section I perform
comparative static analyses to describe the aggregation and distributional impacts of the
microeconomic impacts of weather shocks.
To provide a tractable exhibition of how weather-driven microeconomic impacts affect
macroeconomic outcomes in an economy, I present a comparative static analysis of an
idiosyncratic weather shock to a single industry i in the region r. Specifically, I assume
that all other industries j in the region r are not directly affected by the weather shock in
that region. In other words, those industries are insulated from or resilient to their local
weather. While these assumptions are inconsistent with reality, where weather shocks can
be expected to occur throughout the economy and will affect all industries in a county
dependent on their sensitivity to local weather, it allows for a clearer analysis of aggregate
and distributional macroeconomic impacts of a micro-level weather shock.
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4.3.1 Channels
Before presenting the aggregate and distributional impacts of an idiosyncratic weather
shock, I present three channels through which weather shocks impact economic outcomes:
the composition effect, the wage effect, and the scale effect. The aggregate and distribu-
tional impacts can be decomposed into a combination of these three effects.
Composition Effect
The composition effect accounts for the change in the productivity-adjusted labor input
share following a weather shock. Following an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir,










, if j, s = i, r
0, if j, s 6= i, r
(4.12)
For all producers other than the producer in industry i and region r that is directly af-
fected by the weather shock, the composition effect is 0. This is because those producers
are not directly affected by the weather shock, and thus their labor productivity is not af-
fected. For producer ir, the composition effect depends on the elasticity of substitution and
the direct effect of the weather shock on labor productivity. If producers are complemen-
tary, σ < 1, the composition effect for producer ir a positive productivity shock gives a
negative composition effect. Producer ir uses less labor to produce the same quantity of
output because it needs less to produce the same amount of output while complementary
producers demand more labor. If producers are substitutes, σ > 1, a positive productiv-
ity shock gives a positive composition effect. Producer ir uses more labor because it has
become more productive, drawing demand away from substitute producers. In the edge
case of Cobb-Douglas production technologies, σ = 1, the composition effect is 0 for all




The wage effect accounts for the change in equilibrium economy-wide wage rate following











where λir = wLirwL̄ is the share of value added in the economy provided by producer ir.
The wage effect shows that an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir has a propor-
tional effect on the economy-wide wage rate, scaled by the labor compensation share, or
equivalently value-added share, of producer ir relative to the economy. If a weather shock
boosts the labor productivity of the producer directly affected by the shock, this increases
the demand for labor in the economy, in turn increasing the value and thus the price of labor
based on the size of producer ir as an employer of labor in the economy.
Scale Effect
The output effect accounts for the change in output of a producer following a weather
shock. Following an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir, the scale effect for the










The scale effect shows that an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir has a propor-
tional effect on the output of all producers in the economy, scaled by the value-added share
of producer ir relative to the value-added of the economy. If a weather shock boosts the
labor productivity of the producer directly affected by the shock, this increases the wage
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rate of the economy, in turn increasing the income of households. This increase in income
increases the demand for final goods and thus the output of producers.
4.3.2 Aggregate Impacts
I first analyze the aggregate impact of an idiosyncratic weather shock to the representative
producer for industry i in the region r on the equilibrium GDP of the economy. I maintain
the assumption that the idiosyncratic weather shock in the region r that only directly affects
industry i in the region r to facilitate interpretation.










Proof. See Appendix section B.2.
For an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir, the macroeconomic impact, mea-
sured as the change in (log) GDP of an economy, is proportional to the impact of the
weather shock on labor productivity of producer ir. The weather-driven labor productivity
shock is scaled by the value-added share, or share of labor compensation, of the affected
producer relative to the aggregate economy. This result implies that the impact of a weather
shock on a producer’s labor productivity and the share of value-added of that producer are
sufficient statistics for measuring how a micro-level weather shock to a producer impacts
aggregate economic outcomes in an economy.
Theorem 4.3.1 is a direct consequence of the wage effect shown in Equation (Equa-
tion 4.13). The GDP of the economy, or equivalently the income of households, is equal
to the wage rate times the labor endowment since labor is inelastically supplied. Thus, the
impact of an idiosyncratic weather shock on aggregate household income for the economy
is simply given as the impact on the wage rate since the labor endowment is constant.
This result implies that the impact of weather shocks on labor productivity and the
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share of value-added of a producer are sufficient statistics for how micro-level weather
shocks to a producer impact aggregate economic outcomes in an economy. This finding
is consistent with previous theoretical findings for the macroeconomic impacts of micro-
level productivity shocks [112]. As discussed by [120], to a first-order approximation for
any constant returns to scale production technology in a competitive economy, a factor-
augmenting shock impacts aggregate output proportionally to the cost of the factor for the
producer as a share of GDP of the economy.
4.3.3 Distributional Impacts
Here I analyze the distributional impacts of an idiosyncratic weather shock on the value-
added of producers throughout the economy. This highlights important channels of reallo-
cation and spillovers following micro-level weather shocks.
Before describing these distributional impacts, I provide an important measure, which
I term the labor demand effect. This measure captures the change in labor input for a pro-
ducer following an idiosyncratic weather shock. Applying the equation for labor demand,
given in Equation (Equation 4.6), the labor demand effect can be further disaggregated into
a composition effect, wage effect, and scale effect. Together, the change in labor demand


















, if j, s 6= i, r
(4.16)
The change in labor demand for producer js depends on the value-added share of pro-
ducer ir relative to the economy, the elasticity of substitution, and the size of the impact of
the weather shock on labor productivity for producer ir. Since, by definition, λir < 1, the
sign of the impacts critically depend on the elasticity of substitution.
The intuition of the labor demand effect is as follows. I first consider complementary
factors of production, where σ < 1. Consider a weather shock that boosts labor produc-
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tivity for producer ir. As a result, labor input decreases for producer ir and increases for
complementary intermediate inputs js 6= ir. Following a productivity shock to producer
ir, there is an increase in demand for its output as well as producers of complementary in-
termediate inputs. Since producer ir requires less labor input to provide the same quantity
of output, labor shifts from producer ir to other producers js.
Next, I consider substitute factors of production, where σ > 1. Consider a weather
shock that boosts labor productivity for producer ir. As a result, labor input increases for
producer ir and decreases for substitute intermediate inputs js 6= ir. Following a produc-
tivity shock to producer ir, there is an increase in demand for its output and a decrease in
demand for producers of substitute intermediate inputs. As a result, producer ir requires
more labor input to satisfy the increase in demand. Thus, labor shifts from other producers
js to producer ir.
Finally, I consider the case of Cobb-Douglas production technologies, where σ = 1. In
this edge case, the labor demand effect is 0 for all producers. This directly follows from the
properties of Cobb-Douglas production technologies where the distribution of factor inputs
is constant across producers.
Following from the assumption that labor is the only primary factor of production, the
value-added of a producer is given by the economy-wide wage rate time their labor input.
Thus, the value-added effects that I analyze next are composed of a wage effect given by
Equation (Equation 4.13) and the labor demand effect.
Own Effect
I first describe the effect of an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir on its value added.










Proof. See Appendix section B.2.
Theorem ?? illustrates that the change in value-added for producer ir following an
idiosyncratic weather shock to that producer depends on the size of the resulting labor
productivity shock, the elasticity of substitution, and the size of the producer measured as
their share of value-added.
To describe the intuition of the own-value added effect, I first consider the case of
complementary producers, where σ < 1. Considering a weather shock that boosts the
labor productivity of producer ir, the net sign of the value-added effect is indeterminant.
In the case of complementary producers, the wage effect and the labor demand effect work
against each other. When the producer represents a large fraction of the economy, the
value-added effect is more likely to be positive because the wage effect becomes stronger.
When the producer is small, the change in productivity has a smaller effect on the overall
wage of the economy and the labor demand effect dominates.
Next, consider the case of substitute factors of production and final goods, where σ >
1. In this case, the wage effect and the labor demand effect work in the same direction.
Considering a weather shock that boosts the labor productivity of producer ir, the value-
added effect is positive, meaning that the change in productivity proportionally translates
into an increase in value-added.
Finally consider the edge case of Cobb-Douglas production technologies, where σ =
1. In this case, the labor demand effect becomes 0 because of the properties of Cobb-
Douglas technologies as discussed above. As a result, the own-value added effect becomes
equivalent to the wage effect.
Spillover Effect
Next, I describe the effect of an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir on the value-
added of other producers, js 6= ir. Since these industries are assumed to not directly
experience weather shocks, these effects constitute spillover impacts of a weather shock
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through the general equilibrium economy.










Proof. See Appendix section B.2.
Following an idiosyncratic weather shock to producer ir, the change in value-added
of other producers js depends on the size of the resulting labor productivity shock, the
elasticity of substitution, and the size of producer ir measured as their share of value-added.
To describe the intuition of the indirect-value added effect, I first consider the case of
complementary producers, where σ < 1. Considering a weather shock that boosts the
labor productivity of producer ir, the net sign of the value-added effect is positive. This
suggests that a positive weather-driven labor productivity shock to producer ir increases
the value-added of other producers js. In the case of complementary producers, the sign
of the indirect-value added effect is unambiguous because the wage effect and the labor
demand effect work in the same direction.
Next, consider the case of substitutable producers, where σ > 1. In this case, the
wage effect and the labor demand effect work against each other. Considering a weather
shock that boosts the labor productivity of producer ir, the value-added effect is positive
for any elasticity of substitution less than 2. When producers are less substitutable, the
wage effect dominates the labor demand effect. However, for sufficiently substitutable
producers, σ > 2, the labor demand effect begins to dominate the wage effect, and the sign
of the indirect value-added becomes negative.
Finally, consider the edge case of Cobb-Douglas production technologies, where σ = 1.
In this case, the labor demand effect becomes 0 because of the properties of Cobb-Douglas
technologies as discussed above. As a result, the indirect-value added effect becomes
equivalent to the wage effect.
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These comparative static analyses provide two key takeaways. The first takeaway is
that aggregating the microeconomic impacts of weather shocks throughout an economy
into macroeconomic impacts requires information on just the microeconomic impacts of
weather shocks on primary factors of production, such as labor productivity, and the size of
the economic agents, producers, affected. In the empirical analysis below, I apply the find-
ings of Theorem 4.3.1, using data on the size of producers and empirical estimates of the
impact of weather on their labor productivity to construct estimates of the macroeconomic
impacts of weather shocks for the US economy.
The second key takeaway is that the economic variable of interest used in empirical
analyses of weather impacts is important. Often empirical studies of the impact of weather
shocks on economic outcomes focus on value-added as an outcome of interest, the depen-
dent variable in regression analyses. Theorem ?? importantly illustrates that how weather
shocks translate into impacts on value-added depends critically, both in magnitude and
sign, on fundamental characteristics of the economy, such as the substitutability of pro-
ducers, and the granularity of the study. Further, Theorem ?? illustrates that, in general
equilibrium, weather shocks can spillover through the economy. This suggests that using
an equilibrium economic measure such as value-added rather than an economic determi-
nant such as labor productivity as the outcome of interest could lead to biased estimates.
4.4 Empirical Context
In this section, I introduce the empirical setting in which I demonstrate how to aggre-
gate microeconomic weather impacts into macroeconomic impacts following the theoreti-
cal framework above. In this quantitative exercise, I estimate the macroeconomic impacts
of weather shocks across the United States from their local microeconomic impacts on la-
bor productivity at the county-industry level. I focus on impacts through labor productivity
because of the abundance of empirical evidence documenting a causal relationship and due
to data availability limitations [108, 109]. From Theorem 4.3.1, this analysis requires in-
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formation on the size of county-industry producers, the size of the weather shocks, and
the sensitivity of labor productivity growth to local weather shocks. The first two can be
measured with data. The last I empirically estimate. Below I present the data I use in the
analysis.
4.4.1 Economic Data
To measure the economic size of region-industries and their labor productivity growth, I
use data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This data covers 15 2-digit
NAICS industry classifications across 3,080 counties in the contiguous United States from
2001 to 2017. These industry classifications span agriculture, manufacturing, and services
and are listed in Table B.1. For this analysis, I drop the government industry. The economic
size of county-industries, represented by value-added, is provided directly by the BEA.
Labor productivity growth at the county-industry level, however, is not. Thus, I construct
a novel measure of county-industry labor productivity growth as described below. Panel
A of Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the economic data used in the empirical
analysis.
Due to the level of resolution for these measures, the BEA censors select observations
primarily based on their size for privacy concerns. These censored data comprise only
around 2% of the aggregate GDP in any year, suggesting that they will have little impact
on the aggregate impacts estimates constructed below. I also argue this censorship is un-
likely to bias empirical estimates of the sensitivity of labor productivity growth to weather
shocks because the data is not censored based on labor productivity growth, the constructed
variable of interest.
Labor Productivity
For data on labor productivity growth at the county-industry resolution level, I construct a
novel dataset of labor productivity growth measures for 14 2-digit NAICS industries across
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Economic Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 2009 4.9 2001 2017
Value Added per capita ($US2012) 3,461.0 90,924.4 0 48,648,796
Growth Value Added per capita 0.00821 0.276 -7.898 9.359
Population 98,646.1 315,531.8 55 10,120,540
Employed 4,933.0 19,725.8 0 986,040
Growth Labor Productivity 0.0222 0.841 -19.63 20.23
Compensation 225,131.4 1,269,437.0 0 123,169,232
Industry Value Added 992.8 816.4 95.60 4,088.5
Industry Gross Output 1,771.1 1514.7 195.5 6,590.8
Growth Industry Gross Output Price Index 0.0233 0.0549 -0.315 0.265
Panel B: Weather Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Temperature (◦C) 12.66 4.530 1.339 25.10
Precipitation (mm/year) 97.32 36.55 4.842 222.8
Mean Temperature (◦C) 12.66 4.477 3.228 24.32
Mean Precipitation (mm/year) 97.32 32.97 13.56 185.1
∆ Temperature (◦C) 0.0320 0.886 -3.362 2.910
∆ Precipitation (mm/year) 0.570 23.54 -107.6 92.14
Unit of observation is a county in a year. There are 3,080 counties, 15 industries, and 17 years, totalling 785,400
observations.
counties in the United States. Due to the high correlation in weather across space, how this
measure is constructed is important for generating unbiased estimates of the sensitivity of
labor productivity growth to weather shocks.2
Starting with the assumption of perfect competition, which implies that labor is com-
pensated its marginal product, I derive a measure of labor productivity growth that will
provide unbiased estimates of sensitivity to weather shocks under the CES production tech-
nology from Equation (Equation 4.3). Solving for labor productivity and differencing to

















2See Appendix section B.2 for a discussion of bias in empirical estimates based on labor productivity
growth measure.
3The derivation of this measure is in Appendix section B.2
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where φirt = wLirtpirtyirt represents the fraction of sales revenues that go to the compensation
of labor. This result suggests that labor productivity growth can be captured by the com-
bination of the growth in labor compensation as a fraction of sales and the growth of sales
relative to physical labor input, controlling for price changes.
From Equation (Equation 4.19), constructing a measure of county-industry labor pro-
ductivity growth requires data on the elasticity of substitution (σ), labor compensation
(wLirt), labor input (Lirt), gross output (pirtyirt), and prices (pirt). I set the elasticity of
substitution to σ = 0.5 following previous empirical estimates [121, 122].4 Data on labor
compensation and labor input for county-industries is directly observable in data provided
by the BEA. However, data on gross output and prices are not available at the county-
industry level, they are only reported at the industry level.
To get an approximate measure of county-industry prices, I assume that for a given










The growth of industry-level price indices is directly observable, as reported by the BEA.
To approximate county-industry gross output, I assume that the gross output for each
region r in industry i is proportional to the gross output of the aggregate industry based on
the region r’s share of the aggregate value-added of the industry. That is, I assume
pirtyirt = κirtpityit
where κ = V Airt
V Ait
is the proportional scaling factor.
Together, applying these assumptions, I construct an approximate measure of county-
4The appendix provides a sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity of substitution.
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To provide suggestive evidence of the validity of this labor productivity growth mea-
sure, Figure 4.1 displays county-industry labor productivity growth in 2005 measured based
on Equation (Equation 4.20) against the commonly used labor productivity measure of the
ratio of value-added to labor input. There is a high but imperfect correlation between the



















-4 -2 0 2 4
Growth VA/Labor
Figure 4.1: Growth of Labor Productivity Measures in 2005 Growth of labor productiv-
ity versus growth of value added per labor employment in 2005.
4.4.2 Weather Data
To measure weather shocks, I follow previous work in using aggregate measures of tem-
perature and precipitation as a proxy. Specifically, I use population-weighted measures
of country-level annual mean temperature and precipitation from Terrestrial Air Tempera-
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ture and Precipitation: 1900-2017 Gridded Monthly Time Series (version 5.01) [123, 71,
72, 110]. These gridded temperature and precipitation measures come from interpolated
weather station data and have a resolution of 0.5×0.5 degrees, or about 56km×56km at the
equator. Concerns of biased estimates from the use of weather station data are unlikely to
apply since this analysis focuses on the US [124]. I aggregate the gridded weather mea-
sures to annual population-weighted county-level measures using gridded population data
for 2000 [71]. This weighting accounts for the spatial heterogeneity in the importance of
weather fluctuations, giving greater weight to areas where there are more people, and thus,
often more production.
While economic data is at the county-industry level, due to lack of spatial data for the
economic activity of industries within a county, weather data for each industry within a
county is proxied by weather at the county-level. On average, a county in the US is around
1,000 miles2 and within a county there is a high correlation in weather fluctuations year
to year. This suggests that county-level measures of weather are a good proxy for weather
fluctuations for industries within each county.
Panel B of Table 4.1 displays the weather-related summary statistics for the counties
analyzed in this paper. Figure 4.2 displays the distribution of population-weighted annual
average temperature observations as well as a simple average of county-level changes in
population-weighted temperature over the sample period. The summary statistics and fig-
ures show that there is significant variation in temperature and weather observations across
the sample. Further, there is significant variation and fluctuation in the year-to-year changes
in temperature and precipitation with a slight average increase in temperatures over the
sample period.
4.5 Empirical Estimation
With data on the economic size of producers and the size of weather shocks, I lastly need
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Figure 4.2: Weather Data (a) displays the distribution of temperature observations across
counties and years in the sample. (b) displays the simple average of annual county temper-
ature and precipitation changes in the sample.
a causal relationship between county-industry labor productivity growth and local weather
shocks using panel data fixed effect methods. I follow the regression model of [110] and
estimate different variations of the following regression estimation equation.
∆ log(Airt) = αir + αt + β1∆Temprt + β2∆Preciprt + εirt (4.21)
On the left-hand side of the regression equation is growth in labor productivity in an
industry i in county r at time t. On the right-hand side are county-industry fixed effects αir,
time fixed effects αt, and changes in temperature and precipitation. Panel data fixed effects
methods exploit the exogeneity of weather fluctuations, allowing for the identification of
a causal relationship between weather and economic outcomes. While this approach has
been employed in a variety of settings (see [83] for a review), the appropriate choice of
functional form for the estimating equation is still debated.
The inclusion of panel data fixed effects controls for potential omitted variables that
could bias the coefficient of interest, β1 and β2. County-industry fixed effects control for
factors that are specific to each county-industry pair and time-invariant over the sample,
such as policy differences or demographic differences. Year fixed effects control for time-
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varying shocks that are common to all county-industries, such as a recession. Once con-
trolling for these fixed effects, identification of the relationship of interest relies on the
exogeneity of weather fluctuations and the assumption that any drivers of county-industry
deviations in labor productivity are not correlated with weather shocks.
I estimate a growth effect for labor productivity for two reasons. First, by differencing
the left-hand-side, we alleviate potential concerns of non-stationarity. Not controlling for
the non-stationarity of productivity growth could lead to spurious results. Second, recent
empirical estimates comparing the growth and level effects of weather shocks on economic
outcomes provide evidence of weather shocks having a growth effect ([71]).
4.5.1 Pooled Estimates
I begin with a pooled estimate of Equation (Equation 4.21). This model assumes a homo-
geneous relationship between weather shocks, measured as temperature and precipitation
changes, and labor productivity growth for all county-industry pairs.
Table 4.2: Linear Labor Productivity Sensitivity Sigma 0.5







Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Temperature is measured in C. Precipita-
tion is measured in mm/year. The unit of observation is
a county-industry in a year. Regression includes county-
by-industry fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by county and industry.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 4.2. The temperature coefficient sug-
gests that a 1◦C increase labor productivity growth rates by 0.39%. An increase in tem-
perature of 0.66◦C, the average change in temperature in a given year across counties in
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the sample, would increase labor productivity growth rates by 0.26%. However, I find no
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between weather shocks and labor pro-
ductivity growth rates for these pooled estimates. This is consistent with previous macroe-
conomic estimates that have found no significant relationship between temperature and
economic growth for the United States [71, 72]. The same holds for precipitation.
4.5.2 Differences Across Industries
The nature of production in each industry is considerably different, so it is naive to expect
the sensitivity of labor productivity to weather shocks across industries to be homogeneous.
For example, industries with greater exposure to outdoor weather, such as agriculture, min-
ing, utilities, construction, and manufacturing, are likely to be more sensitive to weather
shocks [108].
To account for a heterogeneous relationship between weather shocks and labor pro-
ductivity growth across the 14 different NAICS 2-digit industries, I estimate a model that
allows for heterogeneous relationships between weather changes and labor productivity
growth for each industry. This regression estimating equation takes the form


























+ αir + αt + εirt
(4.23)
Figure 4.3 displays the regression coefficient estimates for Equation 4.23 and 95% con-
fidence intervals. Contrary to the pooled response, these results provide suggestive evi-
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dence of a statistically significant and heterogeneous relationship between weather shocks
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Figure 4.3: Heterogeneous Industry Response Temperature and precipitation regression
coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with 95% confidence
intervals. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by county and industry. Regression statistics: Nobs=457,625;
R2=0.0737.
Consistent with previous empirical findings, industries that are likely to have higher ex-
posure to outdoor weather are also found to be the most sensitive to weather shocks, both
in terms of temperature and precipitation changes. For example, agriculture is found to
be the most sensitive. Results suggest that a 1◦C increase in annual temperature decreases
labor productivity growth rates for agriculture production in a county by around 8.4%. A
10mm increase in annual precipitation in a county increases agriculture labor productivity
growth rates by around 3%. For the utilities industry, a 1◦C increase in temperature in a
county decreases labor productivity growth rates by 3.3% and a 10mm increase in annual
precipitation in a county decreases labor productivity growth rates by 0.74%. These re-
sults suggest a need for industrial disaggregation to allow for heterogeneous responses to
weather shocks.
I find evidence that the relationship between weather shocks and labor productivity
growth rates varies across industry classifications not just in magnitude but also in sign.
Labor productivity growth in some industries is found to be harmed by increases in tem-
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perature, while others benefit. Exploring mechanisms for the heterogeneous relationships
between weather shocks and factor productivities is an important area for future work.
4.5.3 Differences in Climate
The above estimates allow for heterogeneous sensitivity across industry classifications,
however, it maintains a pooled response within industry classifications across the spatial
distribution of economic activity across the United States. As with industrial composition,
it is naive to consider a homogeneous response across US counties. For example, there
may be a difference in sensitivity to weather shocks across counties on the basis of climate.
A 1◦C increase in temperature in Koochiching, MN where the average annual temperature
is below 2◦C can be expected to have a different effect than a 1◦C increase in tempera-
ture in Palm Beach, FL where the average annual temperature is above 24◦C. Thus, I next
estimate a new empirical model that allows for differential responses both across industry
classification and across counties based on whether a county is a hot county, where a hot
county is defined as having an average temperature over the sample above the median of
around 13◦C. In this application, a county’s average temperature is used as a proxy, though
an imperfect one, of a county’s climate.
Figure 4.4 displays the regression coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals
differentiated by industry classification and separately for hot and cold counties. These re-
sults provide further evidence of heterogeneous sensitivity to temperature and precipitation
changes across industries, consistent with the estimates shown in Figure 4.3. Again, in-
dustries that are more likely to be exposed to outdoor weather, such as agriculture, mining,
utilities, and construction have a higher sensitivity to weather shocks.
Comparing regression coefficient estimates between hot and cold counties across the
different industry classifications suggests that there is some evidence of a differential re-
sponse to weather shocks across counties based on their average temperature over the sam-
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Figure 4.4: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Hot/Cold Temperature and precipi-
tation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification and
hot/cold counties with 95% confidence intervals. Hot counties are those with mean tem-
peratures above the median. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and industry. Regression statistics:
Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0749.
across industries. For temperature sensitivity, being a hot county significantly increases
sensitivity for agriculture; construction; information; educational services, health care, and
social assistance; and arts, entertainment, and recreation. However, wholesale trade and
other services are found to be less sensitive to temperature changes in hot counties. For pre-
cipitation sensitivity, utilities; wholesale trade; educational services, health care, and social
assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation are more sensitive to changes in precipita-
tion in hot counties. Agriculture is found to be less sensitive to precipitation changes in hot
counties. For mining, construction, transportation, information, the sign of the relationship
changes between hot and cold counties. Though not true for all industries, most industries
appear to be more sensitive to weather shocks in hotter counties. This again suggests the
importance of allowing for heterogeneous responses across industry classifications.
To allow for greater flexibility in heterogeneous sensitivity to weather shocks across
counties on the basis of their climate, proxied by a county’s average temperature over the
sample period, I estimate a non-linear relationship that includes an interaction of changes
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Figure 4.5: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Temperature Temperature and
precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification
and county mean temperature with 95% confidence intervals. Regression includes county-
by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and
industry. Regression statistics: Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0748.
Figure 4.5 shows the results of interacting ∆Temperature and ∆Precipitation with a
county’s average temperature. Specifically, I plot the partial effects of the coefficient esti-
mates for each industry classification across counties in the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile
of average temperature along with the 95% confidence intervals. I find a heterogeneous re-
lationship across industry classifications and a non-linear relationship across counties that
is consistent with the hot dummy variable estimation approach.
4.5.4 Differences in Income
Previous empirical studies of the effect of weather on economic outcomes have found ev-
idence that economic development can be an important determinant of the sensitivity of
a region to weather [71, 110]. For example, regions with higher income levels may have
a greater ability to invest in adaptation mechanisms to reduce climate sensitivity. Thus, I
examine for any evidence of differential sensitivity to weather shocks across counties on
the basis of their economic status. Specifically, I first estimate a new regression model that
includes an interaction between changes in temperature and precipitation with an indicator
variable for poor counties, where a county is indicated as poor if its mean income per capita
74
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Figure 4.6: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Rich/Poor Temperature and precip-
itation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification and
rich/poor counties with 95% confidence intervals. Counties are considered poor if the mean
income per capita is below the median. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-
by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and industry. Regression
statistics: Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0742.
Figure ?? displays the regression coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals
differentiated by industry classification as well as by poor and rich counties. Compar-
ing the regression coefficients between poor and rich counties across the different industry
classifications suggests that differences in economic development or status on the basis of
its average income per capita can be an important factor in determining the impact of a
weather shock. Unlike hot versus cold counties, across nearly every industry classification
poor counties are more sensitive to weather shocks, both temperature changes or precipi-
tation changes. This result suggests that even in the United States, a developed economy,
differences in economic status across regions of the country can be important for the impact
of weather shocks.
To allow for greater flexibility in heterogeneous sensitivity to weather shocks across
counties on the basis of their economic status or development, I estimate a non-linear re-
lationship that includes an interaction of changes in temperature and precipitation with a
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Figure 4.7: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Income per capita Temperature
and precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classifi-
cation and county mean income per capita with 95% confidence intervals. Regression
includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by county and industry. Regression statistics: Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0743.
Figure 4.7 shows the results of interacting ∆Temperature and ∆Precipitation with a
county’s average income per capita. Specifically, I plot the estimated partial effect of
∆Temperature for each industry for counties in the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of av-
erage income per capita along with the 95% confidence intervals. Again there is evidence
of a heterogeneous response to weather shocks both across industries and across counties
with poorer counties typically more sensitive to weather shocks than richer counties.
4.6 Aggregate Impacts
In this section, I construct macroeconomic estimates of the microeconomic impacts of cli-
mate shocks across the United States. From Theorem 4.3.1, the aggregate impact of a mi-
croeconomic weather shock is equal to the product of the size of the producer, measured as
their share of GDP in the economy, and the effect of the local weather shock on their labor
productivity. To construct these estimates I combine data on the economic size of county-
industries and the size of the weather shocks discussed in section 4.4 with the estimated
sensitivity of labor productivity growth rates to local weather shocks from section 4.5.
To construct an estimate of the macroeconomic impacts for the US in any given year
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from the micro-level weather shocks, I sum the contributions of the microeconomic impacts
to macroeconomic growth across spatial distribution and industrial composition. Specifi-
cally, building on Theorem 4.3.1 I calculate the macroeconomic impact of weather shocks







With data on λirt−1, the share of GDP, and ∆f(Wrt), the change in relevant weather
variables, and empirical estimates of βit, the sensitivity of local labor productivity to changes
in weather, I calculate the annual macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks in the US over
the sample period. This impact on macroeconomic growth is converted into a dollar impact
by taking the product with GDP in the previous period.
Figure (Figure 4.8) shows the estimated annual macroeconomic impacts of weather
shocks across the US from 2003 to 2017. These estimates apply the microeconomic coef-
ficient estimates for the non-linear model specification that allows for heterogeneity based
on the initial climate of counties shown in Figure (Figure 4.5). Results for other empirical
specifications are consistent. The point estimates represent the mean macroeconomic im-
pact estimates. The bounds represent the 95% confidence interval which is calculated by
appropriately weighting the variance-covariance matrix from the microeconomic regres-
sion coefficient estimates. These confidence intervals capture uncertainty in macroeco-
nomic impacts based on uncertainty in sensitivity to microeconomic weather shocks. These
estimates do not include county-industry-year observations with missing data on labor pro-
ductivity growth or GDP. These missing observations represent less than 2% of annual
GDP, so they are unlikely to significantly change the qualitative or quantitative findings.
I find that the macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks in the US are statistically in-
significant. In each year, the size and even the sign of the macroeconomic impacts vary,
ranging from around -$100 Billion to $100 Billion or around -0.5% to 0.5% of annual US
































Figure 4.8: Macroeconomic Impact of Weather Shocks by Year. Macroeconomic im-
pact of weather shocks across the United States in each year year. Points show the mean
estimate. Bounds show the 95% confidence interval.
years 2013 and 2015 have the largest mean macroeconomic impacts in magnitude and sim-
ilarly have the largest average changes in temperature. Consistently across each year, how-
ever, I fail to find evidence of significant macroeconomic impacts at the 95% confidence
level. This result is robust to alternative estimates for the sensitivity to microeconomic
weather shocks across regression specifications.
The finding that weather shocks have a statistically insignificant impact on macroeco-
nomic outcomes in the US is consistent with previous findings. Existing empirical analyses
of the macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks that examine the relationship between
country-level weather shocks and economic outcomes, both growth and level, typically
measured by GDP per capita, have similarly found statistically insignificant impacts of
weather shocks for developed and northern, cooler economies, including the US [71, 72,
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110]. Together, these findings stand in contrast to the empirical microeconomic evidence
that labor productivity in the US, a fundamental determinant of economic outcomes, is
sensitive to weather shocks.
4.6.1 Decomposition
To explore the disconnect between the microeconomic and macroeconomic impacts of
weather shocks, I decompose the constructed macroeconomic impact estimates into its
underlying contributions. Specifically, I calculate the contributions to macroeconomic im-
pacts of weather shocks across industries, counties, and county-industry pairs. By decom-
posing the macroeconomic impacts of weather shocks across the economy, I can examine
the insignificant macroeconomic impact shown in Figure 4.8 to determine what factors
contribute to the insignificant effect.
To perform this decomposition, I calculate on the relevant components of Equation (??).
For the industry-level contributions to macroeconomic impacts, I only sum macroeconomic
impact contributions across counties for each industry. For the county-level contributions to
macroeconomic impacts, I only sum macroeconomic impact contributions across industries
for each county. For the county-industry-level contributions, I drop both summations.
Here it is important to distinguish between a contribution to macroeconomic growth
and the net impact of weather shocks for a county, industry, or county-industry, as they are
not necessarily identical. As shown by Theorem 4.3.3, weather shocks can have spillover
or indirect effects on economic outcomes elsewhere in the economy through labor markets
or production networks. Since this analysis is focused on understanding the insignificant
effect of weather shocks on macroeconomic outcomes, I focus on the contributions rather
than the microeconomic outcomes.
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Industry-level Contributions
Figure 4.9 displays the industry-level contributions to the macroeconomic impacts of weather
shocks aggregated across the spatial distribution of economic activity. Panel A displays the
contributions by industry by year. Industries that statistically significantly boost macroeco-
nomic growth in a year are green, industries that statistically significantly slow macroeco-
nomic growth in a year are in red, and industries that have a statistically insignificant effect
on macroeconomic growth in a year are white. Similarly, Panel B displays the aggregate
contribution of industries with a statistically significant positive impact on macroeconomic
growth with a 95% confidence interval shown in green and the aggregate contribution of
industries with a statistically significant negative impact on macroeconomic growth and

































Figure 4.9: Industry-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contribution to
macroeconomic growth for statistically significant aggregate industry-level weather im-
pacts by year. Panel (a) displays by industry. Panel (b) shows the aggregate impacts of the
statistically significant positive and negative effects separately.
When aggregated across space, I still observe statistically significant contributions to
macroeconomic impacts for many of the industries. Weather shocks to nearly every indus-
try have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth in at least one year, the exceptions
being manufacturing and professional and business services. This is likely due to the in-
significant relationship between weather shocks and labor productivity for the industries
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found at the microeconomic scale. Further, weather shocks across half of the industries
have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth in at least five of the 15 years in the
sample.
The number of industries that experience weather shocks that have a statistically signif-
icant impact on macroeconomic growth varies by year, as does the sign of the impact within
industries across years. This variation is largely a combination of the variation in weather
shocks in any given year and the sensitivity of industries. As shown in Panel B of Figure
??, while temperatures are rising over the sample, changes in temperature and precipitation
fluctuate across the sample years. So if labor productivity is found to grow with an increase
in temperatures for an industry, it will have a positive impact on macroeconomic growth in
years where temperatures are predominantly rising and will have a negative impact in years
where temperatures are predominantly falling.
As evidenced in the microeconomic analysis above, industries have heterogeneous sen-
sitivity to weather shocks. This goes for both the sign and significance of the effect. Thus,
in a year where temperatures are rising, we can expect heterogeneous contributions to
macroeconomic growth across industries depending on whether they are found to bene-
fit from rising temperatures or are harmed. Additionally, in years with smaller changes in
temperatures, we can expect that only industries with the strongest sensitivity to weather
fluctuations to have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth at the aggregate level.
These significant industry-level aggregate impacts on macroeconomic growth can be
economically significant as well. For example, focusing on the industries that have a sig-
nificant negative impact on macroeconomic growth in each year, Panel B of Figure 4.9
shows that these slowdowns in labor productivity can reduce macroeconomic growth by
anywhere from $50 to $100 Billion in a year. This represents around 0.5% of the annual
US GDP.
These results suggest that it is not the aggregation of microeconomic impacts of weather
shocks across the spatial distribution of economic activity alone that leads to statistically
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insignificant macroeconomic impacts. There is evidence of contributions for select indus-
tries in select years, however, due to the heterogeneity in these contributions as well as the
uncertainty in impacts for others, when aggregated again across industries, the significance
of weather shocks becomes masked.
County-level Contributions
Figure 4.10 displays the county-level contributions to the macroeconomic growth of weather
shocks aggregated across the industrial composition of economic activity within each county.
Panels A and B are the county-level comparable of Panels A and B of Figure 4.9 discussed
above. Counties are sorted on the vertical axis of Panel A by the frequency of statistically
significant weather impacts. This sorting is chosen to visually demonstrate the persistence

































Figure 4.10: County-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contribution to
macroeconomic growth for statistically significant aggregate county-level weather impacts
by year. Panel (a) displays by county, sorted by the frequency of significant aggregate
county-level impacts. Panel (b) shows the aggregate impacts of the statistically significant
positive and negative effects separately.
When aggregated across industries, I still observe statistically significant macroeco-
nomic impacts by county. Two-thirds of counties experience weather shocks across their
industrial makeup that, when aggregated, have a significant impact on macroeconomic
growth. These significant impacts are persistent across the sample years for around half
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of US counties.
The magnitude and sign of the county-level aggregate contributions to macroeconomic
growth vary across years both across and within counties. As with the industry-level ag-
gregate contributions, much of the variation is explained by variation in annual weather
shocks. How this annual variation translates into variation at the county-level depends on
the industrial makeup of a county as well as the county’s sensitivity to weather shocks.
Based on the microeconomic sensitivity estimates, hotter counties are more likely to have
a significant impact on macroeconomic growth in a given year. For example, of the 21
counties that have a significant impact in every year of the sample, 15 are hot counties.
Additionally, counties with a larger economic composition of sensitive industries are
more likely to have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth in a given year. For ex-
ample, Missouri has six counties that have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth
in each year of the sample. Each of those counties has an agriculture industry that com-
poses over 20% of its annual GDP. On the national scale, agriculture composes less than
1% of annual GDP. Agriculture is consistently found to be the most sensitive industry to
weather shocks, so counties with a higher composition of agriculture are likely to be more
sensitive to weather shocks.
These significant county-level aggregate impacts on macroeconomic growth can be eco-
nomically significant as well. For example, focusing on the counties that have a significant
negative impact on macroeconomic growth each year, Panel B of Figure ?? shows that
these slowdowns in labor productivity can reduce macroeconomic growth by anywhere
from $50 to $100 Billion in a year, comparable to the industry-level aggregate slowdowns.
This represents around 0.5% of the annual US GDP.
These results suggest that it is also not the aggregation of microeconomic impacts of
weather shocks across the industrial composition of economic activity alone that leads to
statistically insignificant macroeconomic impacts. There is evidence of contributions for
select counties in select years; however, when aggregated again across counties, the signifi-
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cance of weather shocks becomes masked because of variation in the size and, importantly,
in the sign of these contributions as well as the uncertainty in impacts for others.
County-Industry level Contributions
Finally, I calculate the contributions to macroeconomic growth across county-industry
pairs. Figure 4.11 displays the statistically significant county-industry contributions. Pan-
els A and B show the significant contributions by county and industry in 2009 and 2010,
respectively. Counties are again sorted by the frequency of significant contributions to
macroeconomic growth. Panel C shows the macroeconomic impacts as well as the aggre-
gate contributions from statistically significant positive and negative contributions at the
county-industry level separately.
Comparing Panels A and B of Figure 4.11 to Panel A of both Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10,
it can be seen that as the macroeconomic impacts are further disaggregated, significant
impacts become more frequently identifiable. The macroeconomic impacts in both 2009
and 2010 are found to be insignificant, and the mean estimates are found to be small.
However, when these impacts are decomposed, it can be seen that every industry has a
significant impact on macroeconomic growth in at least one county and nearly every county
has a significant impact on macroeconomic growth through at least one industry.
Comparing the impacts of weather shocks on macroeconomic growth in 2009 and 2010
at the county-industry level provides insight into what drives the uncertainty in macroe-
conomic estimates. In both years, the mean estimates are close to zero. However, the
uncertainty in the macroeconomic impact is much larger in 2010 than in 2009, as seen in
Panel C of Figure 4.11. In panel A of Figure 4.11 there is significant heterogeneity in im-
pacts across both industries and across counties as evidenced by the amount of pink and
green in each column and row. However, in panel B of Figure 4.11, there is less variation in
impacts across industries, with lots of either pink or green in any column. This is likely due


































Figure 4.11: County-Industry-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contri-
bution to macroeconomic growth for statistically significant county-industry-level weather
impacts by year. Panel (a) and (b) display county-by-industry impacts for 2009 and 2010,
respectively. Counties are sorted by the frequency of significant aggregate county-level
impacts. Panel (c) shows the aggregate impacts of the statistically significant positive and
negative effects separately.
in 2010 as evidenced in Panel B of Figure 4.2. As a result, aggregating the small, hetero-
geneous impacts in 2009 leads to a more precise estimate of no macroeconomic impact
for that year. In 2010, there are large positive and large negative impacts. Together, these
cancel in the aggregate, leading to small mean estimates, but large uncertainty.
This decomposition analysis demonstrates that the finding of no macroeconomic im-
pacts in the United States is a consequence of aggregating heterogeneous and sometimes
uncertain microeconomic impacts across the industrial composition and spatial distribution
of economic activity. This finding highlights the importance of spatial and industrial dis-
aggregation in weather shock impacts, as aggregation can mask considerable underlying
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heterogeneity. I show in Appendix section B.3, that these findings are robust to different
values of the elasticity of substitution as well as different microeconomic empirical speci-
fications.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I introduce weather shock impacts into a general equilibrium theoretical
framework. This provides a growth accounting framework that describes how to aggregate
local micro-level weather shocks into macroeconomic impacts. I apply this framework to
the US and construct annual estimates of the macroeconomic impacts of micro-level shocks
to labor productivity growth rates across the industrial composition and spatial distribution
of economic activity within the country from 2002 to 2017.
The growth accounting framework introduced in this paper permits the examination
of the seemingly paradoxical result that economic activity in the US is found to be sen-
sitive to weather shocks at the microeconomic scale while macroeconomic studies have
predominantly found the US to be insensitive to weather shocks. Consistent with previ-
ous findings, I show evidence of a significant, but the heterogeneous relationship between
weather shocks and labor productivity growth rates at the county-by-industry level. How-
ever, when these impacts are aggregated, I find no evidence of sensitivity to weather shocks
at the macroeconomic scale.
Decomposing the macroeconomic impact estimates into the underlying contributions at
higher resolution, I show that macroeconomic insensitivity is a consequence of aggregating
heterogeneous and uncertain microeconomic weather impacts across the industrial compo-
sition and spatial distribution of economic activity in the US. As the level of resolution
increases, so does the frequency of identifiable statistically significant impacts. However,
these impacts are varied in both sign and magnitude. Thus, when aggregated, the microe-
conomic impacts become masked.
It is important to reiterate and make clear the limitations of the analysis in this paper.
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First, in the theoretical framework, I focus on the first order aggregate impacts of microe-
conomic shocks. These first-order effects are independent of the underlying production
structure of the US economy. This facilitates the analysis conducted in this analysis, since
there do not exist, to my knowledge, inter-regional input-output network data for the US.
Recent work in the production network literature has shown that second-order impacts can
be important [120]. Estimating the second-order macroeconomic impacts for microeco-
nomic weather shocks is an area for future work.
Second, the empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the impact of weather shocks
through their effect on labor productivity. As I discuss following Theorem ??, it is im-
portant to focus on the effect of weather shocks on primary factors of production because
general equilibrium economic measures, such as value-added or GDP, can lead to biased
estimates. I specifically focus on labor productivity growth as the channel for weather
shocks both because there is considerable microeconomic evidence of this channel as well
as data limitations. It is possible that these estimates may actually capture the impact of
weather shocks on other factors of production if they are correlated with labor. Addition-
ally, it is possible that weather shocks can impact economic outcomes through other factors
of production, such as capital accumulation. I leave this as an area for future work.
Third, there are potential issues of data quality or measurement error for the constructed
measure of labor productivity growth. Because data does not exist for gross output at the
county-industry level for the US, I assume that regional gross output within an industry is
proportional to industry aggregate gross output based on the region’s share of value-added
for that industry. Additionally, data on value-added is censored by the BEA. Unfortunately,
there is no way to alleviate potential concerns of measurement error or bias due to these
data issues. However, for censorship, I argue concerns are partially alleviated because the
censored data represents a small proportion of the overall economy and the data is censored
on value-added, but the empirical analysis focuses on labor productivity growth, which is
not directly correlated with value-added. I show that the key takeaways are robust to the
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choice of elasticity of substitution.
Fourth, there are potential concerns about the appropriate specification of the microe-
conomic relationship between weather shocks and labor productivity growth rates. In the
paper, I use panel data fixed effects methods to remove many concerns around the potential
for omitted variable bias. I additionally regress on first differences of weather variables to
mitigate concerns of non-stationarity in the panel analysis. Further, I estimate a variety of
empirical specifications to examine factors that have been shown to be important in previ-
ous empirical analyses, such as a region’s climate or economic development and I find the
key takeaways of the analysis are robust across specifications.
Understanding the relationship between climate and economic outcomes is important
for informing policymakers in the face of expected climate change. For example, macroe-
conomic empirical analyses have recently been implemented to estimate country-level so-
cial cost of carbon (CSCC), a simplified measure widely recommended by economists as a
guide for policymakers [76]. The macroeconomic estimates that provide the foundation of
these CSCCs find the US to be relatively insensitive to weather shocks. However, as I show,
understanding the underlying heterogeneity that can be masked by these macroeconomic




The essays composing this dissertation contribute to the discourse in economics around
climate change and solar geoengineering. They document the current state of solar geo-
engineering economics, highlight important areas where economics is well-poised to con-
tribute to the discussion, and push the boundaries of our current perception of both solar
geoengineering and climate change impacts. Notably, these essays explore and emphasize
the distribution and heterogeneity of impacts, an important contribution particularly for
discussions around climate justice and both the ethics and governance of solar geoengi-
neering.
Chapter 2 documents the evolution of economic thinking around solar geoengineering,
highlighting the role of its distinctive characteristics as a climate policy option. In the essay,
I highlight the distribution of impacts, uncertainties and risk, and strategic decision-making
as important avenues for economics to contribute to critical discussions around the ethics
and governance of solar geoengineering. Following these findings, Chapter 3 empirically
analyzes the distributional impacts of solar geoengineering implementation and finds that,
in contradiction to prevailing concerns, solar geoengineering reduces inter-country income
inequality by benefiting hotter, poorer countries most. Chapter 4 takes a step back and
focuses on the empirical estimation of the relationship between the climate and macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Starting with a theoretical foundation, the paper constructs estimates of
the aggregate impacts of weather shocks and demonstrates that the aggregation of weather
shock impacts across the spatial distribution and industrial composition of the US economy
masks considerable underlying heterogeneity.
While these essays make important contributions to the discussions around climate
change and solar geoengineering, they are not the final word. As concluded in Chapter
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2, it is important for “economists to embrace this area and go play in the sandbox with
other researchers across all the disciplines currently involved in solar geoengineering [and




SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR “CLIMATE ECONOMETRIC MODELS




























































































Figure A.1: Climate Projections a, ensemble mean of temperature projections for change
in near-surface temperature from 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005 for models participating
in CMIP5. b, ensemble mean of precipitation projections for change in precipitation from
2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005 for models participating in CMIP5. c, ensemble mean
of temperature change from a 1◦C change in temperature from solar geoengineering for
12 models participating in the GeoMIP G1 experiment. d, ensemble mean of precipitation
change from a 1◦C change in temperature from solar geoenginxeering for 12 models par-
ticipating in the GeoMIP G1 experiment. e, grid-cell population density in year 2000 used






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.12: Projected global GDP per capita over the 21st Century. Each line repre-
sents the median projection different climate scenario. The filled area represents the 95%
confidence interval for climate impacts. Each panel represents the projections from a dif-
ferent Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP). a uses the model from column (1) in Table
Table A.1; b uses column (2); c uses column (3); d uses column (4); e uses column (5); f
uses column (6); g uses column (7); h uses column (8); i uses column (9); j uses column
(10); k uses column (11).
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Figure A.23: Percentage Gain in GDP per capita in 2099 relative to the scenario with
no changes. Each panel displays the country-level percentage gain in GDP per capita for
the RCP 8.5, geoengineering mirrored RCP 8.5, and geoengineering stabilized RCP 8.5
scenarios relative no changes scenario in 2099. a uses the model from column (1) in Table
Table A.1; b uses column (2); c uses column (3); d uses column (4); e uses column (5); f
uses column (6); g uses column (7); h uses column (8); i uses column (9); j uses column
(10); k uses column (11).
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Figure A.24: GDP per capita in 2099. Projected country-level GDP per capita in 2099.
Results are for the model in column (1) of Table Table A.1 for SSP3.
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Figure A.25: Percentage Gain in GDP per capita from 2010 to 2099. Results are for the
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Figure A.36: Country GDP per capita over time. Each line represents a single country.
The color of each line represents the country’s initial GDP per capita in 2010. Each panel
shows a different SSP. Each subfigure shows a different climate impacts model. a uses the
model from column (1) in Table Table A.1; b uses column (2); c uses column (3); d uses
column (4); e uses column (5); f uses column (6); g uses column (7); h uses column (8); i
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Figure A.47: Lorenz Curve for share of global GDP. Each line represents the distribution
of the projected share of global GDP in 2099 for a different climate scenario in addition to
the initial distribution in 2010. Each panel displays a different SSP. Each subfigure displays
a different climate impacts model. a uses the model from column (1) in Table Table A.1; b
uses column (2); c uses column (3); d uses column (4); e uses column (5); f uses column
(6); g uses column (7); h uses column (8); i uses column (9); j uses column (10); k uses
column (11).
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Figure A.50: Projected global GDP per capita over the 21st Century across precip-
itation and temperature response to solar geoengineering. Economic projections for
Geoengineering Stabilized (a) SSP 1, (c) SSP2, (e) SSP3, (g) SSP4, (i) SSP5 and Geoengi-
neering Mirrored (b) SSP1, (d) SSP2, (f) SSP3, (h) SSP4, (j) SSP5. Each line represents the
median economic projection for temperature and precipitation response for each GeoMIP
climate model individually. Results are for the model in column 1 of Table Table A.1.
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Figure A.53: Projected global GDP per capita over the 21st Century across precipita-
tion response to solar geoengineering. Economic projections for Geoengineering Stabi-
lized (a) SSP 1, (c) SSP2, (e) SSP3, (g) SSP4, (i) SSP5 and Geoengineering Mirrored (b)
SSP1, (d) SSP2, (f) SSP3, (h) SSP4, (j) SSP5. Each line represents the median economic
projection for GeoMIP mean ensemble temperature response and precipitation response for




Table A.1: Regression Results. Summary of regression results for the econometrically
estimated historical climate-economy relationship. Estimated using fixed-effects models
of 165 countries from 1960-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Temp 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.00890∗ 0.00978∗∗ 0.0104∗ 0.00606 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗
(0.00325) (0.00421) (0.00355) (0.00454) (0.00350) (0.00369) (0.00370) (0.00314)
Temp Sq. -0.000487∗∗∗ -0.000316 -0.000466∗∗∗ -0.000454∗∗ -0.000385∗∗∗ -0.000381∗∗∗ -0.000442∗∗∗
(0.000103) (0.000162) (0.000110) (0.000172) (0.000104) (0.000105) (0.000126)
Precip 0.0000145 0.00000672 0.00000992 -0.00000791 0.00000838 0.00000734
(0.0000102) (0.0000141) (0.0000105) (0.0000144) (0.0000105) (0.0000116)
Precip Sq. -4.75e-09 -2.69e-09 -3.23e-09 4.75e-10 -2.08e-09 -2.62e-09
(2.50e-09) (3.52e-09) (2.55e-09) (3.57e-09) (2.41e-09) (2.63e-09)
Temp*Poor 0.0165 -0.00752 -0.0111∗
(0.00932) (0.0106) (0.00527)




Precip Sq.*Poor -4.75e-09 -7.42e-09
(5.07e-09) (5.19e-09)
Change Temp 0.00923∗ 0.0103∗ 0.00945∗
(0.00363) (0.00399) (0.00368)
Change Temp Sq. -0.000333∗ -0.000382∗ -0.000337∗∗
(0.000147) (0.000157) (0.000103)
Change Precip 0.00000334 0.00000384 0.00000340
(0.0000151) (0.0000125) (0.00000877)
Change Precip Sq. -1.12e-09 -1.16e-09 -1.21e-09
(4.83e-09) (1.00e-08) (2.22e-09)
Temperature Function Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
GDP Growth or Levels Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Levels Levels Levels
Time Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Region-Year Region-Year Region-Year Region-Year Region-Year Year Region-Year
Country-Specific Time Trend Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic None None None None Quadratic Quadratic None
Short or Long Run Short Run Short Run Long Run Long Run Short Run Short Run Short Run Long Run
Obs. 6584 6452 5754 5637 6452 6584 6584 5754 6518 6519 6518
R sq. 0.286 0.291 0.321 0.330 0.278 0.267 0.267 0.295 0.371 0.294 0.266
Adj. R sq. 0.221 0.225 0.247 0.253 0.209 0.211 0.211 0.234 0.285 0.229 0.209
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars correspond to ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All models include country fixed effects. Temperature is measured in C. Precipitation is measured in mm/year. Columns
represent models specified as follows. (1) Estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (2) Estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature and
precipitation and lags up to 5 years, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (3) Estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation for rich and poor countries separately, year fixed effects, and a quadratic
country time trend. (4) Estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation for rich and poor countries separately lagged up to 5 years, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (5) Estimates a growth with
linear temperature separately for rich and poor countries, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (6) Estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (7) Estimates
a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (8) Estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation lagged up to 5 years, region-year
fixed effects, and no country time trend. (9) Estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (10) Estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic
temperature and precipitation, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (11) Estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend.
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Table A.2: GeoMIP G1 Experiment Models. Models used to construct mean ensemble















Table A.3: Percentage of countries with an absolute loss in 2099 compared to 2010.
Values represent median projections for SSP3. Columns represent models specified as fol-
lows. (1) Estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation,
year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (2) Estimates a growth model with
quadratic temperature and precipitation and lags up to 5 years, year fixed effects, and a
quadratic country time trend. (3) Estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature
and precipitation for rich and poor countries separately, year fixed effects, and a quadratic
country time trend. (4) Estimates a growth model with quadratic temperature and precip-
itation for rich and poor countries separately lagged up to 5 years, year fixed effects, and
a quadratic country time trend. (5) Estimates a growth with linear temperature separately
for rich and poor countries, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (6) Esti-
mates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature, region-year fixed effects, and no
country time trend. (7) Estimates a pooled growth model with quadratic temperature and
precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (8) Estimates a pooled
growth model with quadratic temperature and precipitation lagged up to 5 years, region-
year fixed effects, and no country time trend. (9) Estimates a pooled levels model with
quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and a quadratic country
time trend. (10) Estimates a pooled levels model with quadratic temperature and precip-
itation, year fixed effects, and a quadratic country time trend. (11) Estimates a pooled
levels model with quadratic temperature and precipitation, region-year fixed effects, and
no country time trend.
Scenario (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
RCP8.5 (2099) 43.03 46.67 36.97 21.21 16.36 10.91 10.3 6.06 0 0 0
Geo Stabilized RCP8.5 (2099) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geo Mirrored RCP8.5 (2099) 10.91 0 8.48 0 28.48 18.79 20 5.45 0 0 0
No Climate Change (2099) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.4: Percentage of countries with a relative loss compared with no climate
change in 2099. Values represent median projections for SSP3. Columns as in Table
S3.
Scenario (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
RCP8.5 (2099) 76.36 100 72.73 100 35.76 64.24 63.64 66.06 76.97 76.97 75.76
Geo Stabilized RCP8.5 (2099) 32.73 53.33 32.12 57.58 39.39 24.24 29.7 24.24 32.73 32.73 32.12
Geo Mirrored RCP8.5 (2099) 32.12 0 35.76 0 92.73 41.82 41.82 39.39 36.36 36.36 36.36
No Climate Change (2099) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.5: Projected country-level Gini Coefficients. Values represent median projec-
tions for SSP3. Columns as in Table S3.
Scenario (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
RCP8.5 (2099) 0.8740 0.6452 0.8572 0.7626 0.8335 0.8382 0.8372 0.7544 0.5875 0.5882 0.5876
Geo Stabilized RCP8.5 (2099) 0.5735 0.5703 0.5736 0.5727 0.5834 0.5849 0.5840 0.5842 0.5823 0.5823 0.5823
Geo Mirrored RCP8.5 (2099) 0.4595 0.5063 0.4379 0.5621 0.3488 0.4499 0.4538 0.4568 0.5772 0.5764 0.5771
No Climate Change (2099) 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824 0.5824
(2010) 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482 0.7482
150
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR “FROM MICRO-LEVEL WEATHER
SHOCKS TO MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS”
B.1 Data Description
Table B.1: List of Industries
NAICS Code Industry Description







48-49 Transportation and warehousing
51 Information
52-53 Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing
54-56 Professional and business services
61-62 Educational services, health care, and social assistance
71-72 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services





































































































































































































































































(σ − 1) + λir(2− σ)
]
(B.6)
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Bias for value added per unit labor
Here I show that using value added per unit labor as a measure of labor productivity growth
can lead to biased empirical estimates in the relationship between labor productivity growth
and weather shocks when weather shocks are correlated across an economy.
I begin with the growth of labor productivity for an industry i in region r at time t,
155
measured as the log difference of the ratio of value-added to employment.











Differentiating this measure of labor productivity growth for an industry i in region r













































Thus, labor productivity growth for an industry i in region r at time t is not independent
of weather shocks in other industries j in regions s at time t.
Derivation of unbiased labor productivity measure
According to classic labor theory, wages should be reflective of (equal to) the marginal





























Plugging this back in, I find the following expression for the share of total revenues that















































I now find an equation for growth in labor productivity measured as the difference of
















Bias for new labor productivity measure
Here I show that labor productivity growth measure derived from theory leads to unbi-
ased empirical estimates in the relationship between labor productivity growth and weather
shocks when weather shocks are correlated across an economy.
I begin with the growth of labor productivity for an industry i in region r at time t,
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Differentiating this measure of labor productivity growth for an industry i in region r





































Thus, labor productivity growth for an industry i in region r at time t is are independent




Here I re-estimate the historical relationship between weather shocks and county-industry
labor productivity across the US for different values of the elasticity of substitution. In
particular, I re-estimate with σ = 0.3 and σ = 0.9. I estimate each of the models examined
in the text for σ = 0.5.
Comparing results across different values for the elasticity of substitution, it is clear
that the quantititative estimates change, but the qualitative findings are consistent across
values. This is because the elasticity of substitution scales the constructed labor productiv-
ity growth rates, as shown in Equation (Equation 4.20).
σ = 0.3
Table B.2: [Linear Labor Productivity Sensitivity Sigma 0.3







Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Temperature is measured in C. Precipita-
tion is measured in mm/year. The unit of observation is
a county-industry in a year. Regression includes county-
by-industry fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects.
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.1: Heterogeneous Industry Response Temperature and precipitation regression
coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with 95% confidence
intervals. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Stan-
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.2: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Hot/Cold Temperature and precipi-
tation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with
95% confidence intervals. Hot counties are those with mean temperatures above the me-
dian. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard er-
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.3: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Temperature Temperature and
precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification
and county mean temperature with 95% confidence intervals. Regression includes county-
by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.4: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Rich/Poor Temperature and precipi-
tation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with
95% confidence intervals. Counties are considered poor if the mean income per capita is
below the median. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects.
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.5: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Income/capita Temperature
and precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classi-
fication and county mean income per capita with 95% confidence intervals. Regression
includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by county and industry. Regression statistics: Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0743.
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σ = 0.9
Table B.3: [Linear Labor Productivity Sensitivity Sigma 0.9







Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Temperature is measured in C. Precipita-
tion is measured in mm/year. The unit of observation is
a county-industry in a year. Regression includes county-
by-industry fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects.












Ed. Serv. & Health



























Ed. Serv. & Health













-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
∆Precip Coefficient
(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.6: Heterogeneous Industry Response Temperature and precipitation regression
coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with 95% confidence
intervals. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Stan-
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.7: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Hot/Cold Temperature and precipi-
tation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with
95% confidence intervals. Hot counties are those with mean temperatures above the me-
dian. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard er-
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.8: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Temperature Temperature and
precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification
and county mean temperature with 95% confidence intervals. Regression includes county-
by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county and
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.9: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Rich/Poor Temperature and precipi-
tation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classification with
95% confidence intervals. Counties are considered poor if the mean income per capita is
below the median. Regression includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects.
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(b) Precipitation Coefficients.
Figure B.10: Heterogeneous Industry Response by Mean Income/capita Temperature
and precipitation regression coefficients differentiated by NAICS 2-digit industry classi-
fication and county mean income per capita with 95% confidence intervals. Regression
includes county-by-industry and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by county and industry. Regression statistics: Nobs=457,625; R2=0.0773.
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B.3.2 Macroeconomic Impacts
Non-linear Response by Mean Income/capita
Here I present the macroeconomic impact estimates and decomposition constructed from
the microeconomic estimates for elasticity of substitution σ = 0.5 and for the empirical
specification that allows for heterogeneity across industries as well as across counties based
on mean income per capita shown in Figure Figure 4.7.
Comparing with the results shown in the text, the quantitative results differ slighly.
However, the differences do not change the qualitative results or the key takeaways. The
macroeconomic impacts are still statistically insignificant across all the years. Consistent
with the results in the text, as the macroeconomic impacts are decomposed in the under-
lying county, industry, and county-industry contributions, the significance increases with
resolution. This suggests that the aggregation masks considerable underlying heterogeneity






























Figure B.11: Macroeconomic Impact of Weather Shocks by Year. Macroeconomic im-
pact of weather shocks across the United States in each year year. Points show the mean































Figure B.12: Industry-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contribution to
macroeconomic growth for statistically significant aggregate industry-level weather im-
pacts by year. Panel (a) displays by industry. Panel (b) shows the aggregate impacts of the
































Figure B.13: County-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contribution to
macroeconomic growth for statistically significant aggregate county-level weather impacts
by year. Panel (a) displays by county, sorted by the frequency of significant aggregate
county-level impacts. Panel (b) shows the aggregate impacts of the statistically significant

































Figure B.14: County-Industry-level Contributions to Macroeconomic Growth Contri-
bution to macroeconomic growth for statistically significant county-industry-level weather
impacts by year. Panel (a) and (b) display county-by-industry impacts for 2009 and 2010,
respectively. Counties are sorted by the frequency of significant aggregate county-level
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